

THE

METAPHYSIC OF MORALS.

V O L. II.

DEPARTMENT OF MODALS

VOLUME II

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THE
METAPHYSIC_{OF} MORALS

DIVIDING INTO
METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF LAW AND
OF ETHICS,

By E M A N U E L K A N T

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FROM THE GERMAN BY THE TRANSLATOR
OF KANT'S ESSAYS AND TREATISES.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. II.

L O N D O N :

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ROYAL EXCHANGE. 1799.

THE
METAPHYSICS OF MORALS

DIVIDING INTO

METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF LAW AND
OF ETHICS

— the wintry blast of death
Kills not the buds of virtue. No: they spread
Beneath the heavenly beam of brighter suns,
Thro' endless ages, into higher powers.

THOMSON.

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P R E F A C E.

IF there is a *philosophy* (a system of the cognition of reason from conceptions) on any one object, there must be for this philosophy a system of pure conceptions of reason independent upon all condition of intuition, *id est*, a *metaphysic*. — The question is, Whether every *practical philosophy*, as a doctrine of duties, consequently *ethics* (as a doctrine of virtue), stand in need of *metaphysical elements*, in order to be able to erect them as a true science (systematically), not merely as an aggregate of single investigated doctrines (in a fragmentary manner). — Of pure law nobody will doubt this want; for it concerns but the *formal* of the arbitrement that can be limited in the external relation according to laws of liberty; with abstraction from all *end* (as its matter). The doctrine of duties, then, is here a bare *doctrine of knowing* (*doctrina scientiae*). *

In One skilled in *practical philosophy* is not on that account a *practical philosopher*. The latter is he, who makes the *scope of reason* the principle of his actions, by conjoining with it at the same time the knowing thereto necessary: which, as its object are the actions, needs not be spun out to the most subtile threads of metaphysic, if it does not in any manner concern a duty of law — by which upon the balance of justice the *meum* and *tuum*, according to the principle of equality of action and reaction, must be exactly determined and therefore analogous to mathematical precision; — but regards a mere duty of virtue. For the difficulty is not merely to know, *what* it is duty to do (which, on account of the ends that all men naturally have, can be easily laid down), but chiefly the internal principle of the will, namely, that the consciousness of this duty is at the same time the *spring* of the actions, in order to say of him, who connects this principle of wisdom with his knowing, that he is a *practical philosopher*.

In this philosophy (of ethics) it seems to be directly contrary to its idea to recur to *metaphysical elements*, in order to constitute the conception of duty, purified from all that is empirical (every feeling), spring. For what sort of a conception of a force and herculean strength can one form to himself, in order to subdue the inclinations teeming with vice, if virtue shall be obliged to borrow its weapons from the armory of metaphysic? which is an affair of speculation, that but few persons understand to treat. Hence all doctrines of virtue, in classes, from pulpits, and in popular writings, when they are embellished with metaphysical scraps, become truly ridiculous. — But it is not on that account useless, and much less ridiculous, to investigate the first grounds of ethics in a metaphysic; for some one or other must as a philosopher have in view the first grounds of this conception of duty; as otherwise neither security to nor purity in ethics in general could be looked for. To rely therefore upon a certain *feeling*, which, by reason of the effect expected from it, is named *moral*, may fully satisfy the instructor of the people, while he requires as a touchstone of an ethical duty, whether it be so or not, to consider the problem, How, if every person should in every case make thy maxim an universal law, could such a maxim agree with itself? But, if it were feeling merely, which made it our duty to take this position as a touchstone, this duty would not then be dictated by reason, but holden duty but in an instinctive manner, therefore blindly.

No moral principle, however, is in fact grounded (as some have presumed) upon any one *feeling*, but is actually nothing else than obscurely conceived *metaphysic*, with which every person is endowed in his predisposition of reason; as is easily perceived by the teacher, who endeavours to catechise his disciple *socratically* on the imperative of duty, and

its application to the moral judgment of his actions. — The *propounding* of it (the technic), if the teacher does not intend to make a philosopher of his pupil, needs not always be metaphysical, nor the language scholastic. But the *thought* must recur to the very elements of metaphysic, without which neither security nor puteness, nay, not even motive power, is to be expected in ethics.

When one deviates from this principle, and begins from either the pathological, the pure aesthetic, or even the moral *feeling* (the subjective, instead of the objective, practical), *id est*, the matter of the will, its *end*, but not its form, that is, the law, in order thence to determine the duties; indeed no metaphysical elements of ethics have place. — for feeling, by whatever means it may be excited, is always physical. — But ethics then become contaminated in their very source, it is all one whether in schools, or in auditories, &c. For it is not indifferent by what springs as means one is led to a good design (the observance of all duty). — Let *metaphysic* be ever so tedious to those, who pretend to be teachers of wisdom, and who, in the manner of either an *oracle*, or a *genius*, pronounce judgment on the doctrine of duties; it is the indispensable duty of those, who set themselves up for such, to recur, even in ethics, to their metaphysical principles, and to finish their studies first upon the benches of the metaphysical class.

One may reasonably wonder how, after all the purifications of the conception of duty, so far as it is derived from pure reason, it was possible to reduce it again to the *doctrine of felicity*; yet in such a manner, that a certain *moral* felicity, which does not rest upon empirical causes, was fancied for that purpose; which is an absurd nonentity. — The man of reflection, when he has overcome the allurements to vice, and is conscious of having done his,

often sour, duty, finds himself in a state of tranquillity of mind and contentment; which may very well be named felicity; in which virtue is its own reward. — The *eudemonist*, now, says, that this delight, this felicity is the proper motive of his acting virtuously. The conception of duty doth not immediately determine his will, but only by means of the prospect of felicity is he incited to discharge his duty. — It is however clear, as he cannot promise himself this reward of virtue, but from the consciousness of having done his duty, that this must precede; *id est*, he must find himself obliged to do his duty, before he yet imagines, and without ever thinking, that felicity will be the consequence of the observance of duty. He goes in a circle with his *etiology*. He can but hope to be *bappy* (or internally, blessed), when he is conscious to himself of the observance of his duty: but he can only be prompted to the observance of his duty, when he previously sees that he will thereby make himself happy. — In this argutation, however, there is a *contradiction*. For, on the one side, he ought to observe his duty, without first inquiring, what effect this will have on his felicity, by consequence from a *moral* ground; but, on the other side, he can only agnise something to be his duty, when he can count upon the felicity, which will thereby arise to him, therefore according to a *pathological* principle, which is directly the contrary of the former.

In another place (in my Essays and Treatises) I have, I believe, reduced to the most simple expression the distinction of *pleasure*, which is *pathological*, from that which is *moral*. Namely, the pleasure, which must precede the observance of the law, in order to act conformably to it, is pathological, and the conduct follows the *order of nature*; that, however, which the law must precede, in order that it may be felt, is in the *moral order*. — — When this

this distinction is not observed: when *eudamony* (the principle of felicity) instead of *eleutheronomy* (the principle of liberty of the internal legislation) is laid down as a principle, the consequence is the *eutbanasy* of all moral.

The cause of these aberrations is nothing but the following: The categorical imperative, out of which these laws arise in a dictatorial manner, cannot be rendered conceivable to those, who are accustomed but to psychological explications, though they feel themselves irresistibly urged by it. But not to be able to *explain* to one's self what lies totally beyond that sphere (the *liberty* of the arbitrement), however soul-exalting this very pre-eminence of man is to be capable of such an *idea*, is, by the presumptuous pretensions of speculative reason, which feels its faculty so strongly in other fields, as it were, an universal summons of those leagued in support of the omnipotence of the theoretical reason, and provokes them to oppose themselves to that idea, and so at present and perhaps still long, though at last in vain, to impugn and, if possible, to render suspect, the moral conception of liberty.

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INTRODUCTION

TO ETHICS.

ETHICS in ancient times signified the *doctrine of morals* (*philosophia moralis*) in general, which was also denominated the *doctrine of duties*. Afterwards it was judged adviseable to transfer this name to a branch of moral philosophy only, the doctrine of duties which are not subjected to external laws (to which, in Germany, the title, *doctrine of virtue*, has been found suitable); so that at present the system of the universal doctrine of duties is divided into that of *law* (*jus*), which is capable of external laws, and that of *ethics* (*etbica*), which is not capable of them; and this may now suffice.

I.

Exposition of the Conception of Ethics.

THE conception of duty is in itself the conception of a *necessitation* (coaction) of the free arbitrement by the law; this coaction now may be either an *external* one, or a *self-coaction*. The moral *imperative* announces, by its categorical sentence (the unconditional *shall*), this coaction, which therefore doth not refer to rational beings in general (of which there may perhaps be *sacred* ones too), but to *men* as rational *beings of nature*, who, though they acknowledge even the authority of the moral law, are profane enough to have the desire of transgressing it, and, even when they obey it, do it *unwillingly* (with resistance of their inclination),

tion), in which consists the *coaction*.* — But as man is a *free* (moral) being, the conception of duty can comprise no other than the *self-coaction* (by the representation of the law only), when the internal determination of the will (the spring) is considered, for thereby only is it possible to unite that *necessitation* (even were it an external one) with the liberty of the arbitrement, but by which the conception of duty then becomes an ethical one.

The impulses of nature, therefore, contain *impediments* to the fulfilling of duty in the mind of man, and (in part potently) resisting powers, to combat and to overcome which by reason, not first hereafter, but at present (at the same time with the thought) he must judge himself able; namely, to *can* what the law unconditionally orders that he *shall* do.

But the faculty and the deliberate design to resist a strong but unjust opponent is *valour* (*fortitudo*) and, with regard to the opponent of the moral mindedness *in us*, *virtue* (*virtus*, *fortitudo moralis*). The universal doctrine of duties, therefore, in that part,

* Man however finds himself as a *moral being* at the same time (when he contemplates himself objectively, to which he is determined by his pure practical reason, (according to the *humanity* in his own person) sacred enough to transgress the internal law *unwillingly*; for there is no person so profligate who, by this transgression, does not feel in himself a resistance and a detestation of himself, by which he must exercise compulsion on himself. — It is impossible to explain the phenomenon that man on this crossway (where the beautiful fable places Hercules between virtue and pleasure) shows more propensity to listen to inclination than to the law; because we can but explain what happens by deriving it from a cause according to laws of nature; but by which we would not conceive the arbitrement as free. — This reciprocal opposite self-coaction, however, and its inevitability give occasion to cognise the incomprehensible property of *liberty* itself.

part, which does not bring the external, but the internal, liberty, under laws, is a *doctrine of virtue*.

Law has to do with the *formal* condition of external liberty merely (by the agreement with itself, if its maxim were ordained a universal law), *id est, right*. Whereas ethics furnish a *matter* (an object of the free arbitrement), an *end* of pure reason, which is at the same time represented as an objectively necessary end, *id est*, as duty for mankind. — For, as the sensible inclinations seduce to ends (as to the matter of the arbitrement), which may be contrary to duty, legislative reason cannot otherwise obviate their influence, than by an opposite moral end, which must therefore be given *à priori* independently upon inclination.

An *end* is an object of the arbitrement (of a rational being), by the representation of which this (the arbitrement) is determined to an action to produce this object. — I may now, it is true, be compelled to actions, which as means are directed to an end, but can never be compelled by another *to have an end*, but I myself only can *make* something an end for *myself*. — That I however am also bound to make for myself an end of any one thing, which lies in the conceptions of practical reason, consequently, besides the formal determinative of the arbitrement (such as law comprises), to have a material one still, an end, which may be opposed to the end from sensible incentives; this would be the conception of an *end, which is duty in itself*; its doctrine however would belong, not to that of law, but to ethics, which only carry with them in their conception the *self-coaction* according to (moral) laws.

For that reason ethics may also be defined as the system of the *ends* of pure practical reason. — End and duty distinguish the two divisions of the universal doctrine of morals or moral philosophy. That

ethics contain duties, to the observance of which one cannot be (physically) compelled, is the consequence merely of their being a doctrine of *ends*, because a *coaction* or compulsion thereto (to have them) is inconsistent.

But that ethics are a *doctrine of virtue* (*doctrina officiorum virtutis*), follows from the above explication of virtue, compared with the obligation, whose peculiarity has just been shewn. — There is no other determination of the arbitrement, which is thereto appropriated by its conception, not to be able to be even *physically* compelled by the *arbitrement* of others, than that only to an *end*. Another may indeed *compel* me *to do* something, which is not my end (but a mean only to the end of another), but not that *I shall make it my end*, and yet I can have no end, without making it to myself. The latter is in contradiction with itself; an act of liberty, which at the same time is not free. — But to posit an end to one's self, which is at the same time duty, is no contradiction; because I there compel myself, which consists perfectly well with liberty.* — But How is such an end possible? that is at present the question. For the possibility of the conception of a thing (that it does not contradict itself) is not yet sufficient to assume the possibility of the thing

* The less a person can be physically compelled, the more on the contrary he can be morally compelled (by the mere representation of duty), the freer is he. — Whosoever, for instance, has sufficient resolution and strength of mind not to give up an amusement, which he has intended, how great soever the loss, which he thereby sustains, may be represented to him, but on the representation that he hereby either omits a duty of office, or neglects a sick father, desists from his purpose without hesitation, though very unwillingly, evinces his liberty in the highest degree by his not being able to withstand the voice of duty.

thing itself (the objective reality of the conception).

II.

Exposition of the Conception of an End, which is at the same time Duty.

THE relation of the end to duty may be conceived in a twofold manner, either, setting out from the end, to discover the *maxim* of actions conformable to duty, or, *e converso*, beginning from this maxim, to discover the *end*, which is at the same time duty. — *Law* proceeds in the first way. It is left to every one's free arbitrement what end he chuses to lay down for his action. Its maxim, however is determined *à priori*, namely, That the liberty of the actor can consist with the liberty of every other person according to a universal law.

But *ethics* take an opposite way. They cannot set out from the ends, which a person may posit to himself and accordingly dispose of his maxims that may be adopted, *id est*, his duty; for that would be empirical grounds of the maxims, which yield no conception of duty; as it (the categorical *shall*) has its root in pure reason only; as also, if the maxims should be adopted according to those ends (which are all dictated by *solipsism*), the conception of duty could properly speaking have no connexion whatever with the subject in hand. — In ethics, therefore, the *conception of duty* must lead *to ends* and lay the foundation of the *maxims*, in regard to the ends, which we *ought*, according to moral principles, to lay down to ourselves.

Setting aside, then, what sort of an end that is, which is in itself duty and how such an one is possible, it is only necessary here to show that, and why, a duty of this nature bears the name of a *duty of virtue*.

To

To all duty corresponds a right, contemplated as a *moral faculty* (*facultas moralis generatim*), but not *rights* of another corresponding to all duty (*facultas juridica*) to compel any one; these are peculiarly termed *duties of law*. — In this manner the conception of virtue corresponds to all ethical *obligation*, but all ethical duties are not on that account duties of virtue. Those, which concern not so much a certain end (the matter, the object of the arbitrement), as merely the *formal* of the moral determination of the will (exempli gratia, that the action, which is conformable to duty, must also be performed *out of duty*), are not so. Only an *end, which is at the same time duty*, can be denominated a *duty of virtue*. Hence there are several duties (and also diverse virtues); whereas only one virtue is conceived, but which is valid for all actions (the virtuous mindedness).

The duty of virtue is essentially distinct from the duty of law, because for this an external coaction is morally possible, but that rests upon the free self-coaction only. — For finite, *sacred*, beings (who cannot at all be seduced to the violation of duty) there is no doctrine of duty, but merely a doctrine of morals, which is an autonomy of practical reason, while the former comprehends at the same time an *autocracy* of it, *id est*, a consciousness of the *faculty*, not immediately perceived, yet rightly inferred from the moral categorical imperative, to become master of one's inclinations repugnant to the law: so that the human morality in its highest degree can be nothing more than virtue; even were it perfectly pure (totally free from the influence of all alien spring, but that of duty), as it is then commonly personified poetically as an ideal (to which one must continually approximate) under the name of *sage*.

Virtue, however, is not to be explained and estimated as a *habit* merely, and (as the court-chaplain

Cochius

Cochius expresses himself) as a long *custom*, acquired by exercise, of morally good actions. For if this is not an effect of reflected, solid, and more and more purified principles, it is, like every other mechanism of the technically-practical reason, neither armed at all points, nor sufficiently secured from the alteration, which new allurements may occasion.

Annotation.

To virtue = $+$ a is opposed the *negative want of virtue* (moral weakness) = 0 as the *logical opposite* (*contradictorie oppositum*), but vice = $-$ a as the *contrary* (*contrariae s. realiter oppositum*), and it is not only an unnecessary, but an offensive, question, Whether more strength of mind be not required to great *crimes*, than even to great *virtues*? For by strength of mind we understand the strength of resolution of a person, as a being endued with liberty, consequently so far as he is master of his mind (in his wits), therefore in a *healthy* state. But great crimes are paroxims, whose very aspect occasions a shuddering with horror in those of sound minds. The question then will perhaps terminate thus, Whether a man in a fit of madness can have more physical strength, than when he is in his wits; which without ascribing to him on that account more strength of soul, when by soul is understood the vital principle of man in the free use of his powers, may be granted. For, as those (great crimes) have their ground in the might of the inclinations that *weaken* reason, which proves no strength of soul, this question tends nearly to the same with the following, Whether a person in a fit of sickness can give proof of more strength than in a healthy state? which may be directly answered negatively, because the want of health, which health consists in the equipoise of all the bodily powers of man, is a debilitation in the system of these

these powers, according to which only absolute health can be judged.

III.

Of the Ground of conceiving an End, which is at the same time Duty.

AN *end* is an *object* of the free arbitrement, whose representation determines the arbitrement to an action (whereby the end is produced). Every one action therefore has its end and, as nobody can have an end, without *first* making to himself the object of his arbitrement *itself* the end, it is an act of *liberty* of the acting subject, not an effect of *nature*, to have any one end whatsoever of the actions. But as this act, which determines an end, is a practical principle, which commands, not the means (consequently not conditionally), but the end itself (therefore unconditionally), it is a categorical imperative of pure practical reason, consequently such an one, as conjoins a *conception of duty* with that of an end in general.

There must now be such an end and a categorical imperative corresponding to it. For, as there are free actions, there must be ends too, to which, as object, those are directed. Of these ends however there must be some, which at the same time (*id est*, according to their conception) are duties. — For were there no such, all ends would, as no action can be without an end, always be valid for practical reason but as means to other ends, as a categorical imperative were impossible; which annuls all moral philosophy.

Ends, then, which man according to sensible incentives of his nature *makes* to himself, are not the subject of present inquiry, but objects of the free arbitrement under its laws, which he *ought to make* his end. Those may be named the technical (sub-
jective),

jective), correctly speaking, pragmatic, comprising the rule of prudence in the choice of one's ends; but these must be denominated the moral (objective), doctrine of ends, which distinction however is superfluous in this place, because the doctrine of morals is distinctly separated by its conception from the doctrine of nature (here anthropology), which rests upon empirical principles, whereas the moral doctrine of ends, which treats of duties, rests upon principles given *à priori* in pure practical reason.

IV.

What are the Ends, which are at the same time Duties?

THEY are, *one's own perfection — the felicity of others.*

These cannot be exchanged and of *one's own felicity*, on the one side, with *the perfection of others*, on the other, make ends, which are duties in themselves of the same person.

For *one's own felicity* is an end, which all men have (by means of the impulse of their nature), but this end can never be considered as duty, without contradicting one's self. What every one inevitably wills naturally, belongs not to the conception of *duty*; for duty is a *necessitation* to an end adopted unwillingly. It is therefore contradictory to say that one is *under an obligation* to promote his own felicity with all his powers.

It is in like manner a contradiction to make the *perfection* of another my end, and to hold myself bound in duty to its furtherance. For the *perfection* of another man, as a person, just consists in being able *himself*, according to his own conceptions of duty, to posit his end, and it is contradictory to require (to make it my duty) that I shall do something, which nobody but himself can do.

V. *Expli-*

Explication of these two Conceptions.

A.

One's own Perfection.

THE word *perfection* is liable to various mis-
constructions. It is sometimes, as a conception,
belonging to the transcendental philosophy, of the
totality of the multifarious, which collectively taken
constitutes a thing, — but also, as pertaining to
teleology, so understood, that it signifies the agree-
ment of the qualities of a thing with an *end*. Per-
fection in the former signification might be termed the
quantitative (material), in the latter, the *qualitative*
(formal), perfection. That can be but one (for the
whole of what pertains to a thing is one). Of this
however there may be several in a thing; and the
latter is here handled.

When of the perfection belonging to man in
general (properly speaking, to humanity) it is said
that, to make it one's end, is in itself duty, thus it
must be placed in that, which can be the effect of
one's *act*, not what is a gift merely, for which he
has to thank nature; for else it would not be duty.
It can therefore be nothing but the *culture* of his
faculties (or of the predisposition of nature) of which
the *understanding*, as the faculty of conceptions,
consequently of those likewise which refer to duty,
is the highest, but at the same time of his *will* also
(of a moral cast of mind) to fulfill every duty in
general. 1. It is his duty: to use every effort to
raise himself up from the rudeness of his nature, from
animality (*quoad actum*), always more and more to
humanity, by which only he is capable of positing
ends to himself: to remove his ignorance by means
of instruction and to correct his errors, these however
are not *adviseable*, merely by the technically practical
reason,

reason, for his other views (of art), but the morally practical reason absolutely *commands* it and makes this end his duty, in order to be worthy of the humanity, which dwells in him: 2. To elevate the culture of his *will* to the purest sentiment of virtue, namely, when the *law* is at the same time the spring of his actions that are conformable to duty, and to obey it (the law) out of duty, which is internal morally practical perfection, which, as it is a feeling of the effect that the legislative will in himself exercises on the faculty to act accordingly, is the *moral feeling*, as it were, a peculiar *sense*, (*sensus moralis*), which indeed is often abused in an enthusiastic manner, as if it (like the genius of Socrates) preceded reason, or could even dispense with its judgment, but yet is a moral perfection: to make every particular end, which is at the same time duty, his object.

B.

The Felicity of Others.

Felicity, *id est*, contentment with one's situation, so far as he is certain of its continuance, to wish and to seek are unavoidable by human nature; but just on that account not an end which is at the same time duty. — As some still make a distinction between a moral and a physical felicity (the former of which consists in the contentment with one's person and his own moral conduct, therefore with what he *does*, the latter, with that which nature bestows, consequently what one *enjoys* as the gift of another); it must be observed, without here adverting to the abuse of the word (which involves a contradiction), that the former mode of feeling belongs to the foregoing title only, to that of perfection. — For he, who feels himself happy in the mere consciousness of his integrity, already possesses that perfection, which in the foregoing title was

explained as that end, which is at the same time duty.

When felicity, to contribute to which as my end, is duty, is in question, it must be the felicity of *other* men, *whose* (allowed) *end I hereby make mine also*. Whatsoever they may reckon their felicity, is left to themselves to judge; only that I am allowed to refuse many things, which *they* count so, but which I do not hold such, if they otherwise have no right to demand it of me as their own. But to oppose to that end a pretended *obligation* to be under the necessity of taking care of my *own* (physical) felicity, and thus to make a duty (an objective end) of my natural and merely subjective end, is a specious objection, often used, to the above division of duties (no. iv.) and requires to be answered.

Adversity, pain and want are great seducements to the transgression of one's duty. Opulence, strength, health and prosperity in general, which oppose that influence, may, it seems, be considered as ends, which are at the same time duty; namely, to promote *one's own* happiness, and not to aim at that of others merely. — Then however this is not the end, but it is the morality of the subject, from which to remove the impediments, it is the merely *licit* mean; as no other person has a right to demand of me the sacrifice of my ends, which are not immoral. To seek opulence for its own sake is not directly duty; but it may be such indirectly; namely, to prevent poverty as a great seducement to vice. But then it is not my happiness, but my morality, to preserve whose integrity, is at once my end and my duty.

VI.

*Ethics do not give Laws for the ACTIONS (for
JUS does that) but only for the MAXIMS
of Actions.*

THE conception of duty stands immediately in relation to a *law* (though I abstract from every end, as its matter); as the formal principle of duty indicates in the categorical imperative, Act so, that the maxim of thy action may become a universal *law*; only that in ethics this is thought as the law of *thy* own *will*, but not of the will in general, which might be that of others also: when it would make a duty of law, which belongs not to the field of ethics. — The maxims are here considered as such subjective principles, as are merely *qualified* for an universal legislation; which is but a negative principle (not to be repugnant to a law in general). — But how can there then be a law for the maxim of actions?

The conception of an *end*, that is at the same time duty, which peculiarly belongs to ethics, is that only, which grounds a law for the maxims of actions, by subordinating the subjective end (which every one has) to the objective (which every one ought to make to himself). The imperative, Thou shalt make this or that (for instance, the happiness of others) thy end, relates to the matter of the arbitrement (an object). As no free action is possible unless the actor shall at the same time have designed an end (as the matter of the arbitrement), so must, if there is an end, which is at the same time duty, the maxims of actions, as means to ends, comprise but the condition of the qualification for a possible universal legislation; whereas the end, which is at the same time duty, can make it a law to have such a maxim, while for the maxim itself the bare possibility of agreeing with an universal legislation is sufficient.

For maxims of actions may be *arbitrable* and rank but under the limiting condition of the fitness for a universal legislation, as the formal principle of actions. But a *law* annuls that which is arbitrable of actions and is therein distinct from every *recommendation* (as but the fittest means to an end are required to be known).

VII.

The ethical Duties are of a LARGE, but the Duties of Law of a STRICT or narrow, Obligation.

THIS position is a consequence of the foregoing; for if the law can command but the maxim of actions, but not the actions themselves, it is a criterion that it leaves a latitude to the observance for the free arbitrement, that is, cannot precisely give how and how much one is to effectuate by the action for the end, which is at the same time duty. — But by a large duty is not understood a permission for exceptions to the maxim of actions, but only that of the limitation of the one maxim of duty by the other (for example, the universal love of the neighbour by the love of parents), whereby in fact the field for the praxis of virtue is enlarged. — The larger the duty, the more imperfect therefore the obligation of a person to the action is, the nearer however he brings the maxim of its observance (in his mind) to the *strict* duty (of law), the more perfect is his action of virtue.

The imperfect duties are then *duties of virtue* only. The fulfilling of them is *merit*, $= +a$: their transgression however is not directly *demerit*, $= -a$, but merely moral *unworthiness* $= 0$, unless it were the subject's principle, not to accommodate himself to those duties. The strength of the intention only in the former is properly denominated *virtue*, the weakness in the latter not so much *vice*, as rather *defect*

defect of virtue, want of moral strength (*defectus moralis*).^{*} Every action, which is contrary to duty, is named, a *transgression* (*peccatum*): But the designed one, which is become a principle, properly constitutes what is denominated a *vice* (*vitium*).

Though the conformity of the actions to law (to be an honourable man) is nothing meritorious, that of the maxim of such actions, as duties, *id est*, the *reverence* for law, is *meritorious*. For one thereby *makes* the right of humanity, or of men too, his *end*, and by that extends his conception of duty beyond that of *due* (*officium debiti*); because another from his right may demand actions of one according to the law, but not that this shall also at the same time comprehend their spring. In the same manner is circumstantiated the universal ethical commandment, Act conformably to duty, out of duty. To ground and to animate this mindedness in one's self is, like the former, *meritorious*; because it goes beyond the law of duty of actions and makes the law, in itself, at the same time the spring.

But these duties must therefore be numbered with the large obligation, in respect of which duties a subjective principle of their ethical *recompence* (in order to bring them as near as possible to the conception of a strict obligation), that is, the receptibility for a recompence according to the law of virtue, has place, namely, a moral pleasure, which exceeds the bare contentment with one's self (that may be merely negative) and of which one boasts that virtue in this consciousness is its own reward.

If this merit is a merit of a person with respect to other persons, to promote their natural end, which is acknowledged as such by every body, (to make their happiness his own) this may be named the *sweet*

B 3

merit,

* Wie das Wort Tugend von taugen, so stammt Untugend von zu nichts taugen.

merit, the consciousness of which furnishes a moral enjoyment, in which men are inclined to *riot* through fellow-joy; while the *sour merit* to further the true weal of other men, even should they not acknowledge it to be so (of ungrateful, unthankful, men), commonly has not such a reaction, but occasions only *contentment* with one's self, though indeed in the latter case the merit would be still greater.

VIII.

Exposition of Duties of Virtue as large Duties.

I.

One's own Perfection as an End, which is at the same time Duty.

a. PHYSICAL, that is, *culture* of every *faculty* in general, for the promotion of the ends proposed by reason. It is obvious that this is duty, consequently an end in itself, and that cultivation, even without consideration of the advantage it yields us, is not founded in a conditional (pragmatical), but an unconditional (moral), imperative. The faculty of laying down any one end whatsoever to one's self, is that which is characteristical of humanity (in contradistinction to animality). With the end of humanity in our own person is conjoined that of the will of reason, therefore the duty to deserve well of humanity by culture in general, either to supply or to promote the *faculty* of accomplishing all possible ends, so far as it is to be found in man himself, *id est*, a duty to cultivate the rude predispositions of our own nature, whereby the animal elevates itself first to the man: consequently duty in itself.

This duty however is ethical merely, that is, a large obligation. How far one ought to go in cultivation (enlarging and correcting his faculty of understanding, *id est*, in knowledge or in the capacity

capacity of art), no principle of reason prescribes determinately; the difference of the situations too, in which men may happen to be, renders the choice of occupation, for which they have to cultivate their talent, highly arbitrable. — There is therefore no law here for the actions, but only for the maxim of the actions, which runs thus, Cultivate thy mental and bodily powers for the fitness for all ends, with which thou mayst meet, as it is uncertain which of them may one day or other be thine.

b. *Culture of the morality* in us. The greatest moral perfection of man is, to do his duty, *out of duty* (that the law be not only the rule but the spring of actions). — This seems at first sight to be a *strict* obligation and the principle of duty of every action to command not merely the *legality*, but the *morality*, *id est*, the mindedness, with the punctuality and strictness of a law; but in fact the law commands here the *maxim of actions* only, namely, to seek the ground of the obligation, not in the sensitive impulses (advantage or disadvantage), but in the law entirely — consequently not the *action itself*. — — For it is not possible for man to penetrate so into the depth of his own heart, as ever to be fully certain of the purity of his moral intention and of the chastity of his mindedness even but in *one* action; though he is not at all doubtful of its legality. Weakness, which dissuades from the risk of a crime, is often held by the same person virtue (which gives the conception of strength), and how many, who are but *fortunate* to have escaped so many seductions, may have led a long innocent life; it remains concealed from themselves, how much pure moral value lay, in every action, in the mindedness.

Therefore this duty, to estimate the value of one's actions not according to the legality only, but according to the morality (the mindedness), is but of a *large* obligation, the law commands

not this internal action in the human mind itself, but merely the maxim of the action, and to proceed according to every faculty on this principle, That for all actions conformable to duty the thought of duty is of itself a sufficient spring.

2.

THE HAPPINESS of Others, as an End, which is at the same time Duty.

a. **PHYSICAL welfare.** *Benevolence* may be unbounded; for nothing needs hereby be done. But there is more difficulty with *beneficence*, especially if it is not to take place from inclination (love) to others, but from duty, with the sacrifice and mortification of many a concupiscence. — That this beneficence is duty, unfolds itself thus, that, as our self-love cannot be separated from the necessity of being beloved (assisted in cases of need) by others, we make ourselves an end for others, and never can otherwise conjoin this maxim, than merely by its qualification for a universal law, consequently to make others by a will ends for us, the happiness of others is an end, which is at the same time duty.

But I ought, without hope of remuneration, to make to others a sacrifice of a part of my welfare, because it is duty, and it is now impossible to fix determinate bounds, how far that can go. It depends greatly upon what will be every one's real want, according to his feelings, to determine which must be left to every one himself. For to promote the happiness of others by the sacrifice of one's own (of one's real wants), would be a maxim, if it should be ordained a universal law, discordant with itself. — This duty therefore is but a *large* one; it has a latitude to do more or less herein, without the bounds being able to be determinately settled. — The law is valid but for the maxims, but not for determinate actions.

b.. The

b. The *moral wellbeing* of others (*salubritas moralis*) belongs too to the felicity of others, to promote which is our duty, though but a negative one. The pain, which a person feels from a sting of conscience, though its origin is moral, is, as to the effect, physical, like sorrow, fear, and every other sickly state. To prevent this inward reproach from affecting him deservedly, is indeed not just *my* duty, but *his* affair; it is my duty however to do nothing which, according to the nature of mankind, might seduce to that, concerning which his conscience may afterwards torture him, which is named scandal. — But there are no determinate boundaries, within which this care of the moral contentment of others can be contained; wherefore a large or wide obligation only rests upon it.

IX.

What is Duty of Virtue?

VIRTUE is the strength of a person's maxim in the observance of his duty. — All strength is cognised but by obstacles, which it can surmount; with regard to virtue, however, these are the inclinations of nature, which may come into collision with the moral resolution and, as it is man himself, who puts these obstacles in the way of his maxims, virtue is not merely a self-coaction (for then an inclination of nature might strive to compel the other), but a coaction according to a principle of internal liberty, consequently by means of the bare representation of his duty, according to its formal law.

All duties comprehend a conception of *necessitation* by the law; the *ethical ones*, that necessitation to which but an internal legislation, the duties of law on the other hand that, to which an external, is possible; both then of a coaction, which may be either self-coaction or coaction by another; as then

the moral faculty of the former may be termed virtue, and the action springing from such a mindedness (the reverence for the law) an action of virtue (ethical), though the law expresses a duty of *jus*. For it is *ethics*, which command the right of men to be holden sacred.

But that, which it is virtuous to do, is on that account not yet directly proper *duty of virtue*. That may concern the *formal* of the maxims merely, but this refers to their matter, namely, to an *end*, which is at the same time thought as duty. — As the ethical obligation to ends, however, of which there may be many, is but a *large* one, because it comprises in ethics nothing but a law for the *maxim* of actions and the end is the matter (object) of the arbitrement; so there are many, according to the distinction of the legal end distinct, duties, which are named *duties of virtue* (*officia honestatis*), because they are subjected to the free self-coaction merely, but not to that of other persons, and determine the end, which is at the same time duty.

Virtue, as the agreement, founded in the firm mindedness, of the will with every duty, is, like all *formal*, merely one. But with regard to the *end* of actions, which it at the same time duty, *id est*, that, (of the material) which one *ought* to make his *end*, there may be more virtues and the obligation to its maxim is termed a duty of virtue, of which there are likewise many.

The chief principle of ethics is, Act according to a maxim of *ends*, to have which can be an universal law for every one. — According to this principle man is an end to himself as well as to others, and it is not sufficient that he is entitled to use neither himself nor others as a mean barely (thereby he may however be indifferent towards them), but it is man's duty in itself to make man in general his end.

This principle of ethics, as a categorical imperative, admits

admits no proof, but by all means a deduction from pure practical reason. — That, which, in the relation of men to themselves and to others, *can* be an end, *is* an end in the eye of pure practical reason; for it is a faculty of ends in general, in regard of which to be indifferent, that is, to take no interest therein, is a contradiction; as it would not then determine the maxims to actions (as the latter always comprise an end), consequently there would be no practical reason. Pure reason, however, can command no ends *à priori*, but only so far as it announces such as duty at the same time; which duty is then denominated duty of virtue.

X.

The chief Principle of Law is ANALYTICAL; that of Ethics SYNTHETIC.

THAT the external coaction, so far as it is a resistance opposed to the impediment of external liberty agreeing according to universal laws (an impediment to its impediment), can consist with ends in general, is, according to the position of contradiction, clear, and I need not go beyond the conception of liberty to perspect it; the end, which every body has, may be what he pleases. — Therefore the chief principle of law is an analytical position.

Whereas the principle of ethics goes beyond the conception of external liberty and connects with it according to universal laws an *end* still, which it constitutes *duty*. This principle is therefore synthetic. — Its possibility is contained in the deduction (§. IX).

This extension of the conception of duty beyond that of external liberty and its limitation by the formal merely of its thorough agreement, when, instead of the external coaction, the *internal* liberty is set forth, the faculty of self-coaction, not by means of

of other inclinations, but by pure practical reason (which rejects all this mediation), consists herein and raises itself above the duty of Law, namely, that by it *ends* are laid down, from which in general law abstracts. — In the moral imperative, and the necessary presupposition of liberty in its behalf, the *law*, the *faculty* (to fulfil it), and the *will* determining the maxim make up all the elements, which form the conception of the duty of law. But in that, which the *duty of virtue* commands, the conception of an *end* is superadded to that of a self-coaction, not the end which we have, but which we ought to have, which therefore pure practical reason has in itself, whose chief, unconditional *end* (but which is always duty) is placed in this, That virtue is its own end and, by the merit which it has with mankind, also its own reward. (Whereby it, as an ideal, shines in such a manner, that it seems, according to the human eyesight, even to eclipse the *holiness* that is never tempted to transgress;* which is however an illusion, as we are misled, because we have no measure for such a degree of strength, as have the greatness of the impediments, which have been removed (in us the inclinations), to hold the *subjective* conditions of the estimation of a greatness the *objective* ones, the greatness in itself). But compared with *human ends*, which have all their impediments that must be removed, it is perfectly clear that the value of virtue itself, as its own end, far outweighs the value of all profit, and of all empirical ends and advantages, which it may have as its consequence.

It

* — *die Welt mit ihren Mängeln, Ist besser als ein Reich von willenlosen Engeln.* Haller.
If the reader will be satisfied with a translation in humble prose, the thought is, that the world with all its imperfections, is better than a kingdom of angels without will.

It may also be said that mankind are bound to virtue (as a moral strength). For the faculty of overpowering all sensible impulses acting in opposition, can and must, because of his liberty, be absolutely *presupposed*; yet this faculty as *strength* (*robur*) is something, which must be acquired, by elevating to that strength the moral *spring* (the representation of the law) by means of the contemplation of the dignity of the pure law of reason in us, and at the same time by exercise.

XI.

The Scheme of the Duties of Virtue may conformably to the above Principles be erected in the following manner:

The Material of the Duty of Virtue.

I.

One's own End, which is at the same time my duty. (My own *perfection*).

2.

The End of Others, the promotion of which is at the same time my duty. (The *felicity* of Others).

Internal Duty
of Virtue.

3.

The Law, which is at the same time spring. Upon which the *morality* — of every free determination of will rests.

4.

The End, which is at the same time spring. Upon which the *legality*

External Du-
ty of Virtue.

The Formal of the Duty of Virtue.

XII.

*Aesthetical previous Conceptions of the Receptibility
of the Mind for the Conceptions of Duty in
general.*

THERE are such moral qualities, of which, when one does not possess them, there can be no duty to put one's self in possession. — They are the *moral feeling*, *conscience*, the *love* of one's neighbour and the *reverence* for one's self (*self-estimation*), which there is no obligation to have; because they as *subjective* conditions lay the foundation of the receptibility of the conception of duty, but not as objective conditions of morality. They are all *aesthetical* and antecedent, but natural predispositions of mind to be affected by the conception of duty; to have which predispositions cannot be considered as duty, but which every person has and by virtue of which he can be laid under an obligation. — The consciousness of them is not of empirical origin; but can be a consequence of that of a moral law only, as its effect on the mind.

a.

The moral Feeling.

THIS is the receptibility of pleasure or displeasure, merely from the consciousness of the agreement or of the collision of our action with the law of duty. All determination of the arbitrement, however, proceeds *to* the act *from* the representation of the possible action through the feeling of pleasure or displeasure, (to take an interest in the action, or in its effect); when the *aesthetical* state (of the affecting of the internal sense) is either a *pathological*, or a *moral*, feeling. — The former is that feeling, which precedes the representation of the law, the latter

latter that, which can be but a consequence of it.

There can be no duty either to have a moral feeling, or to acquire it for one's self; for this feeling lays every consciousness of obligation as a foundation, in order to become conscious to one's self of the necessitation, which lies in the conception of duty; but every person, (as a moral being) has it originally in himself; the obligation, however, cannot extend but *to cultivate* and, even by the admiration of its inscrutable origin, to strengthen it; which takes place by shewing how, separated from every pathological allurements, and in its purity, it is excited the most even by the mere representation of reason.

It is not proper to term this feeling a moral *sense*; for by the word *sense* is commonly understood a theoretical faculty of perception referred to an object; whereas the moral feeling (like pleasure and displeasure in general) is something merely subjective, which yields no cognition. — Nobody is entirely without moral feeling, he would be morally dead, if (to speak the language of physicians) the moral *vis vitae* could stimulate this feeling no more, humanity (as if according to chymical laws) would be resolved into mere animality and irrecoverably confounded with the mass of the other beings of nature. — But we have just as little a peculiar *sense* for the purpose of discovering the (moral) good and bad, as we have for discovering *truth*, though it is a common mode of expression, but a *receptibility* of the free arbitrement for its being moved by practical pure reason (and its law), and this is what we denominate the moral feeling.

b.

Of Conscience.

IN like manner conscience is not something acquirable and there is no duty to provide one's self with
with

with one; but every person, as a moral being, has it originally in himself. To be bound to conscience would signify the same, as to have the duty incumbent on one's self to acknowledge duties. For conscience is the practical reason representing to man in every case of a law his duty either to acquit or to condemn. Its reference, then, is not that to an object, but merely to the subject (to affect the moral feeling by the act of reference); therefore an infallible matter of fact, but not an obligation and duty. When it is then said, This man has no conscience; the meaning is, that he does not mind its sentence. For had he actually none, he would neither impute to himself any thing as conformable to duty, not reproach himself with it as contrary to duty, consequently could not at all even conceive the duty to have a conscience.

At present I shall pass over the various divisions of conscience and but observe, what is a consequence of the foregoing, that an *erring* conscience is a nonentity. For in the objective judgment, whether something be duty or not, one can indeed err sometimes; but in the subjective, whether I have compared it with my practical (here judging) reason for the behoof of that judgment, I cannot err, because I would not then have judged at all practically; in which case neither error nor truth has place. *Unconscionableness* is not want of conscience, but a propensity not to attend to its judgment. When however one is conscious to himself of having acted according to conscience, nothing more, as to either guilt or innocence, can be required of him. He is but under the obligation to enlighten his understanding concerning that which is duty or not; but when it comes to the act, conscience speaks inarbitrably and unavoidably. It cannot therefore be duty even to act according to conscience, as otherwise there would need to be a second conscience in

order to be conscious to one's self of the act of the former.

The duty here is but to cultivate one's conscience, to rouse the attention to the voice of the inward judge, and to use all means (consequently indirect duty only) to let him have audience.

c.

Of Philanthropy.

LOVE is an affair of *sensation*, and not of volition; I cannot love because I *will*, and still less because I *ought*, (to be obliged to love); consequently a *duty to love* is a nonentity. *Benevolence* (*amor benevolentiae*) can, however, as a doing, be subjected to a law of duty. A disinterested benevolence towards men is often, though very improperly, named *love*; nay, where it does not concern another's happiness, but the total and free yielding-up of all one's ends to the ends of another (even of a superhuman) being, one speaks of love, which is at the same time our duty. But every duty is a *necessitation*, a coaction; if it should even be a self-coaction according to a law. But that, which one does through compulsion, is not done out of love. *To do good* to other men according to our ability, whether one loves them or not, is duty; and this duty loses nothing of its weight, though we must make the sad remark, that our species, alas! is not so qualified, as, when one knows it better, to be found very amiable. — *Misanthropy*, however, even should it consist, without actual enmity, merely in the total separation from men (as Kant terms it the *separatistical* misanthropy), is at all times *odious*. For benevolence always remains a duty, even towards the misanthrope, whom indeed one cannot love, but to whom one ought nevertheless to do good.

To hate vice in men is neither duty nor contrary.

to

to duty, but a mere feeling of abhorrence of it, without either the will's having any influence on it, or this feeling *vice versa* on the will. *Beneficence* is duty. Whoever exercises this often, and whose beneficent design succeeds, comes at last even to love him actually, to whom he has done good. When it is said, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself, it is not meant that thou shalt immediately (first) love and by means of this love (afterwards) do good, but, *Do good* to thy fellow-man, and this beneficence will occasion in thyself philanthropy (as a habit of inclination to beneficence in general).

The love of *complacency* (*amor complacentiae*) only would then be direct. To have a duty to it, however, (as a pleasure immediately conjoined with the representation of the existence of an object), *id est*, to need to be necessitated to have a pleasure in it, is a contradiction.

d.

Of Reverence.

REVERENCE is likewise something merely subjective; a feeling of a peculiar sort, but not a judgment of an object, which there is duty to effectuate or to promote. For it could not, contemplated as duty, be represented but by the *reverence*, which we have for it. To have a duty to this, therefore, would signify, to be bound in duty to duty. — When it is accordingly said, A duty of *self estimation* is incumbent on man, it is improperly expressed and it must rather be, The law in him inevitably extorts from him *reverence* for his own being and this feeling (which is of a peculiar sort) is a ground of certain duties, *id est*, certain actions, which can consist with the duty towards himself, but not that *he has* a duty of reverence towards himself; for he must have a reverence for the law in him,

in order to be able to conceive but a duty in general.

XIII.

Universal Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals in the Treating of PURE Ethics.

IN *the first place*, Only a *single* ground of obligation can be found for a duty, and, should two or more proofs be made of it, it is a certain criterion that there is still either no valid proof at all, or that there are many and distinct duties, which have been holden one duty.

For all moral proofs, as philosophical ones, can be made but by means of a cognition of reason *from conceptions*, but not, as the mathematics do, by the construction of conceptions; the latter admit of a variety of proofs of the same proposition; because *in the intuition à priori* there may be several determinations of the quality of an object, all which lead back to the very same ground. — When, for instance, of the duty of veracity a proof is to be given, first, from the *damage*, which the lie occasions other men, and then from the *unworthiness* of a liar and the violation of the reverence for himself, in the former a duty of benevolence is proved, but not one of veracity, consequently not that, of which the proof was required, but another duty. — As to the plurality of proofs, however, of the very same position, with which one consoles himself that the multitude of grounds will supply the want in weight of every one singly taken, it is a very unphilosophical pretext; because it betrays cunning and dishonesty — for of different insufficient grounds, placed *beside one another*, the one ground does not make up the want of the other to certainty, nay, not even to probability. They must *proceed*, as ground and consequence in *a series*, to the sufficient reason

reason or ground, and can but in such a manner evince. — And yet this is the usual legerdemain of the art of persuasion.

Secondly, The distinction between virtue and vice can never be sought in *degrees* of the observance of certain maxims, but only in their specific *quality* (in the relation to the law); in other words, the famous principle (of Aristotle), To place virtue in the middle between two vices, is false.* Let good husbandry, for example, be given, as the *medium* between the two vices, prodigality and avarice; it cannot, as virtue, be represented as springing up, either by the gradual diminution of the former of the two vices mentioned, (parsimony), or by the augmentation of his expenses, who is addicted to the latter, by meeting one another, as if according to opposite directions, in the good husbandry; but every one of them has its own maxim, which of necessity contradicts the other.

Just as little and for the same reason can a vice in general be explained by either a *greater* execution of certain designs than is conformable-to-end (for instance, *prodigalitas est EXCESSUS in consumendis opibus*),

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* The common, according to the language, ethically classic formulae, *medio tutissimus ibis; omne nimium vertitur in vitium; est modus in rebus &c.; medium tenuere beati &c.; insani sapiens nomen habeat &c.* comprise a stale wisdom, which has no determinate principles at all: for Who can show me this medium between two extremes? *Avarice* (as vice) is not distinguished from frugality (as virtue) by this being carried too far, but has quite another principle (maxim), namely, the end of economy, not in the enjoyment of one's fortune, but, by desisting from it, merely to remain in the possession of the fortune: nor is the vice of *prodigality* to be sought in the excess of the enjoyment of one's fortune, but in the bad maxim, which makes the use, without considering the preservation, of the fortune, the sole end.

opibus), or the effectuating of them less, than is fit, (for example, *avaritia est DEFECTUS* &c.). For, as hereby the *degree* is not at all determined, upon this, however, whether the conduct be conformable to duty or not, depends every thing; it cannot serve as an illustration.

Thirdly, The ethical duties must not be estimated according to the faculty attributed to man of fulfilling the law, but *e converso* the moral faculty must be estimated according to the law, which commands categorically; therefore not according to the empirical knowledge, which we have of men, as they are, but according to the rational, as they ought to be conformably to the idea of humanity. These three maxims of the scientific treatment of ethics are opposed to the more ancient apophthegms:

1. There is but one virtue and but one vice.
2. Virtue is the observance of the medium between opposite opinions.
3. Virtue (like prudence) must be learned from experience.

Of Virtue in general.

VIRTUE signifies a moral strength of the will. But this does not exhaust the conception; for such a strength might be possessed by a *sacred* (super-human) being, in whom no sufficient impulse acts in opposition to the law of his will; who therefore does every thing willingly according to the law. Virtue, then, is the moral strength of the will of a *man* in the observance of his *duty*; which is a moral *necessitation* by his own legislative reason, so far as it constitutes itself a power *executing* the law. — It (virtue) itself, or to possess it, is not duty (for else there would need to be an obligation to duty), but it commands and accompanies its commandment with a moral coercion (possible according to laws of the internal liberty); to which, however, as it must be irresistible,

irresistible, is required strength, whose degree we cannot estimate but by the greatness of the impediments, which a person occasions himself by his inclinations. The vices, as the brood of sentiments contrary to the law, are the monsters, which he has to combat; wherefore this moral strength, as *valour* (*fortitudo moralis*), constitutes the greatest and the only true military honour of man; it is also named the proper, namely, the practical *wisdom*: because it makes the *scope* of the existence of men upon earth its own. — Only in possession of it is man free, healthy, rich, a king &c. and can sustain no loss either by chance or by fate; because he possesses himself, and the virtuous cannot lose his virtue.

All the great praises, that are bestowed on the ideal of humanity in its moral perfection, can lose nothing of their practical reality by the examples of the contrary, either what men are at present, have been, or probably will be in future, and the *anthropology*, which proceeds from mere cognitions of experience, cannot injure the *anthroponomy*, which is erected by the unconditional legislative reason, though virtue (with regard to men, but not to the law) may here and there be said to be meritorious and worthy of a recompence, it must, relatively to itself, as it is its own end, be also considered as its own reward.

Virtue, contemplated in its whole perfection, is therefore represented, not how man possesses it, but as if it possessed man; because in the former case it would have the appearance as if he had had the choice (to which he would then require another virtue still, in order to choose virtue in preference to every other commodity exposed to sale). — To conceive a plurality of virtues (as it is then unavoidable) is nothing else than to conceive various moral objects, to which the will is led from the sole principle of virtue; the opposite vices are circumstantiated in the

very same manner. The word, which personifies both, is an æsthetical machinery, but which points to a moral signification. — Hence an æsthetic of morals is not a part, it is true, but yet a subjective exhibition of the metaphysic of them: where the feelings, which accompany the necessitating power of the moral law, make that its efficacy perceptible to the senses (*exempli gratia*, disgust, shuddering with horror &c. which render sensible the moral indignation), in order to gain the precedence of the *merely* sensitive incitement.

XIV.

Of the Principle of Separation of Ethics from Law.

THIS separation, upon which rests the chief division of *moral philosophy* in general, is founded in the conception of *liberty*, common to both those, rendering necessary the division into the duties of the *external* and the *internal liberty*; the latter of which only are ethical. — Hence these as the condition of every *duty of virtue* (as above the doctrine of conscience as the condition of every duty in general) must be premised as the preparatory part (*discursus praeliminaris*).

ANNOTATION.

Of Ethics according to the Principle of the internal Liberty.

A HABIT is a facility of acting and a subjective perfection of the *arbitrement*. — Not every such *facility*, however, is a *free* habit (*habitus libertatis*); for, when it is *assuetude*, that is, by often reiterated action uniformity of it become *necessity*, it is no habit arising from liberty, consequently no moral one. Virtue cannot therefore be *defined* by the habit of

of free lawful actions; but by all means, if, To determine one's self in acting by the representation of the law, were superadded, and then this habit is not a quality of the arbitrement, but of the *will*, which is, with the rule it adopts, at the same time a universal legislative faculty of appetition, and such an one only can be accounted virtue. But to the internal liberty are required two points, namely, to be master of one's self in a given case (*animus sui compos*), and to rule one's self (*imperium in semet-ipsam*), *id est*, to *bridle* one's affects and to *sway* one's passions. — The *character* or disposition of mind (*indoles*) in these two states is *noble* (*erecta*), but in the opposite case ignoble or base (*indoles abjecta, serva*).

XV.

The first requisite to Virtue is the Dominion over one's self.

AFFECTS and *passions* are essentially distinct from one another, the former belong to *feeling*, so far as it, preceding reflection, renders it more difficult, or even impossible. Hence affect is *hasty* or *precipitate* (*animus praeceps*) and reason says by the conception of virtue that one ought to *contain* himself; this weakness in the use of one's understanding, however, combined with the strength of the movement of mind, is but *a want of virtue* and, so to speak, something infantile, which may subsist with the best of wills and has the advantage that this storm soon blows over. A propension to affect, then, (for instance, anger) allies itself not so much with vice, as passion. Whereas *passion* is the sensible *appetition* grown to a permanent inclination (for example, *hatred* in contradistinction to *anger*). The calm, with which it is indulged, admits of reflection and allows the mind to form principles thereon for itself, and thus,

when the inclination falls upon that which is illegal, to brood over it, to let it take deep root, and thereby (designedly) to adopt the bad as one's maxim; which is then a *qualified bad*, *id est*, a true vice.

Virtue, therefore, so far as it is founded in internal liberty, comprehends a positive commandment to man, to bring all his faculties and inclinations under his subjection (of reason), consequently the dominion over himself, which is superadded to the prohibition, not to suffer himself to be ruled by his feelings and inclinations (the duty of *apatby*); because, unless reason assumes the reins of government, those lord it over mankind.

XVI.

Apatby (considered as Strength) is necessarily presupposed to Virtue.

THE word *apatby*, as if it signified want of feeling or insensibility, consequently subjective indifference with regard to the objects of the arbitrement, has lost its reputation; it was taken to be weakness. This misconstruction may be prevented by naming that want of affect, which is to be distinguished from indifference, the *moral apatby*: as the feelings from sensible impressions lose their influence on the moral but by the reverence for the law's becoming more powerful than them all. — It is but the seeming strength of one in a fever, which allows the active part even in the *good* to rise to affect, or rather to degenerate into it. An affect of this sort is termed *enthusiasm*, and to that must be referred the *moderation*, which is commonly recommended even in exercises of virtue, (*insani sapiens nomen habeat aequus iniqui — ultra quam satis est virtutem si petat ipsam. Hor.*). For else it is absurd to think that one can be either *too wise*, or *too virtuous*. An affect, by whatever object it may be excited,

excited, always belongs to the sensitive faculty. The true strength of virtue is, *the mind being tranquil*, to carry the law of virtue into execution with a deliberate and firm resolution. That is the state of *health* in the moral life; an affect, on the other hand, even when it is excited by the representation of the *good*, is nothing but a momentary sparkling phenomenon, which leaves debility behind. — But he, who, in regard of morality, allows no *indifferent things* (*adiaphora*), strows all his steps with duties as with caltrops, and does not find it indifferent, whether I eat fish or flesh, drink beer or wine, when both agree with me, may be named fantastically virtuous; a micrology which, were it adopted in ethics, would render their government a tyranny.

Annotation.

VIRTUE is always in the act of *advancing* and yet begins always *anew*. — The former is a consequence of virtue, *objectively* contemplated, being an ideal and unattainable, but it is duty nevertheless to approach towards it continually. The latter is founded, *subjectively*, upon the nature of man affected by inclinations, under whose influence virtue, with its maxims once for all received, never can set itself at rest and be stationary, but, if it is not actually ascending, inevitably falls; because moral maxims cannot, like technical ones, be founded upon custom (for this pertains to the physical quality of one's determination of will), but, should their exercise even become customary, the subject would therewith lose the *liberty* in adopting his maxims, which liberty, however, is the character of an action out of duty.

XVII.

Conceptions prior to the Division of Ethics.

THIS principle of division must *first*, as to the *formal*, comprise all the conditions, which serve to distinguish a part of the universal doctrine of morals from the doctrine of law, according to the specifical form, and that happens, 1. by duties of virtue being such, in relation to which no external legislation has place; 2. as every duty must be founded in a law, this cannot in ethics be a law of duty given for the actions, but merely for their maxims; 3. by (what flows from this) ethical duty's being of necessity thought as *large*, but not as strict, duty.

Secondly, as to the *material*, it must be erected, not only as a doctrine of duty, but as a *doctrine of end* too: so that man is bound to conceive, as well himself, as every other person, his end, (which are wont to be named duties of self-love and of the love of one's neighbour which expressions are here taken in an improper signification; because there can be no direct duty to love, but by all means to actions, by which man makes both himself and others end).

Thirdly, as to the relation between the material and formal (between the legality and conformity to-end) in the principle of duty, it is to be remarked that not every *obligation of virtue* (*obligatio ethica*) is a duty of virtue (*officium ethicum, s. virtutis*); in other words, that the reverence for the law in general does not yet ground an end as duty; for the latter only is duty of virtue. Hence there is but *one* obligation of virtue, but *many* duties of virtue; because there are many objects, which are ends for us, to have which is at the same time duty, but only one virtuous mindedness, as subjective determinative to fulfil one's duty, which mindedness extends itself to duties of law likewise, but

but which cannot on that account bear the name of duties of virtue. — Every *division* of ethics, therefore, refers but to duties of virtue. Ethics, contemplated according to their formal principle, are the science of the mode of being laid under an obligation without regard to possible external legislation.

Annotation.

It may however be asked, How I came to introduce the division of ethics into the *elemental doctrine* and the *doctrinal method*; having been able to dispense with it in law? — It is, because those have to do with *large*, but this with merely *strict*, duties; wherefore the latter, which according to its nature must be strictly (precisely) determining, requires, just as little as the pure mathematics, a universal precept (method), how one is to proceed in judging, but it evidences by the fact. — Ethics, on the other hand, unavoidably lead, on account of the latitude, which they allow their imperfect duties, to questions, which challenge judgement to make out, how a maxim in particular cases is to be applied and in such a manner, that this may again furnish a (subordinate) maxim (when it may always be again inquired after a principle of application of this to occurring cases); and thus they fall into a *casuistry*, of which law knows nothing.

Casuistry, therefore, is neither a *science*, nor a branch of one; for that would be a dogmatic and is not so much a doctrine, how something is to be found, as an exercise, how truth shall be sought. *Interwoven in it*, then, in a *fragmentary manner*, not systematically (as the former must be), only, like scholiums, subjoined to the system.

Whereas, to *exercise*, not so much judgement, as rather reason in the *theory* of its duties, as well as in the *praxis*, belongs peculiarly to ethics, as a *doctrinal*

doctrinal method of the morally practical reason; the *first* exercise of which consists in *questioning* the disciple about what he already knows of conceptions of duty, and may be termed the *erotematical* method, and this either because it has been already told him, merely from his memory, which is named the *catechetical* method, or, because one supposes that it naturally lies in his reason and but requires to be unfolded out of it, the *dialogical* (Socratical).

To the catechetic as a theoretical exercise corresponds as a companion, in the practical, the *Ascetic*, which is that part of the doctrinal method, in which not only the conception of virtue is taught, but how as well the *faculty* of virtue, as the will thereto may at once be brought into exercise and cultivated.

According to these principles we shall therefore erect the system in two parts, the *ethical elemental doctrine*, and the *ethical doctrinal method*. Each part will be divided into its heads, which will be again divided into various chapters, in the first part, according to the difference of the *subjects*, to which an obligation is incumbent on man, in the second, according to the distinction of the *ends*, which reason dictates to him to have, (and the receptibility of them.

XVIII.

THE division, which the practical reason delineates in ethics for the foundation of a system of its conceptions (the architectonic), may be made according to two distinct principles, either singly or conjoined: the one, which represents the *subjective* relation of the obliged to the obliging. *according to the matter*, the other, which represents the *objective* relation of the ethical laws to the duties in general in a system, *according to the form*. — The former division

division is that of the *beings*, in reference to which an ethical obligation can be thought; the *latter* that of the *conceptions* of the pure ethically practical reason; which appertain to those its duties, that are then requisite to ethics, only so far as they shall be a *science*, therefore to the methodical composition of all positions, which are found out according to the former.

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FIRST DIVISION OF ETHICS

according to the Difference of the Subjects and of their Laws.

It comprises

Duties

of Man towards
Man

of Man towards Beings
not human

towards
himself.

towards
other
Beings.

infrahuman
Beings.

superhuman
Beings.

SECOND DIVISION OF ETHICS

according to Principles of a System of the pure practical Reason.

Ethical

Elemental Doctrine

Doctrinal Method

Dogmatic Casuistry

Catechetic Ascetic.

The latter division, as it concerns the form of the science, must, as ichnography of the whole, precede the former.

INTRODUCTION

TO THE ETHICAL ELEMENTAL DOCTRINE.

1.

*The Conception of a Duty towards one's self involves
(at first sight) a Contradiction.*

WHEN the *obliging* I is taken in the same sense with the *obliged*, duty towards one's self is a conception contradicting itself. For in the conception of duty that of a passive necessitation is comprehended (I am *bound*). In that it is a duty towards myself, however, I represent myself as *binding*, consequently in an active necessitation; (I, the very same subject, am the binder) and the position, which expresses a duty towards one's self (I *should* bind myself), would be an obligation to be bound (a passive obligation, which, however, in the same sense of the relation, would be at the same time an active one), therefore contain a contradiction. — This contradiction may likewise be discovered by showing that the binder (*auctor obligationis*) can always release the bound (*subjectum obligationis*) from the obligation (*terminus obligationis*); consequently (when both are one and the same subject) he is by no means bound by a duty he imposes on himself; which involves a contradiction.

2.

There are however Duties of Man towards himself.

FOR let us suppose there were no such duties, then there would be none at all, also no external ones. For I cannot cognise myself as bound to others,

but so far only as I at the same time bind myself; because the law, by virtue of which I consider myself as bound, proceeds in all cases from my own practical reason, by which I, being at the same time the necessitating in regard of myself, am necessitated.*

3.

Solution of this seeming Antinomy.

MAN contemplates himself, in the consciousness of a duty to himself, as the subject of it, in a two-fold quality, in the first place as *a being of senses, id est*, as a man (belonging to one of the species of animals), but secondly as *a being of reason* too (not merely a rational being, because reason according to its theoretical faculty might be the quality of a living corporal being likewise), which no sense attains and which can be cognised but in morally practical relations, when the incomprehensible property of *liberty* reveals itself by means of the influence of reason on the internal legislative will.

Man, as a rational *being of nature* (*homo phaenomenon*) is by his reason, as the *cause*, determinable to actions in the sensible world and hereby the conception of obligation does not yet come into consideration. The very same, however, according to his *personality*, that is, conceived as a being indued with internal liberty (*homo noumenon*), is contemplated as a being capable of obligation towards himself (the humanity in his person), so that man (considered in

* Thus it is said, when, for instance, it concerns a point either of the vindication of my honour or of self-preservation, that I owe that to myself. Even when it concerns duties of less consequence, not that which is necessary, but only what is meritorious, of my observance of duty, do I say, for example, I owe it to myself to enlarge my talent for the intercourse with mankind &c. (to cultivate myself).

in a twofold signification), without falling into a contradiction with himself, (because the conception of man is not thought in one and the same sense) may agnise a duty to himself.

4.

Of the Principle of Division of the Duties towards one's self.

THE division can be made but with regard to the object of duty, not with regard to the subject obliging himself. As well the obliged as the obliging subject is never *but a man*, and though it is allowed us, in a theoretical consideration, to distinguish in man soul and body, as qualities of nature of man, from one another, it is not allowed to cogitate them as different substances inducing obligations on man, in order to be entitled to the division into duties towards the *soul* and towards the *body*. — We are not sufficiently informed, by either experience, or conclusions of reason, whether man contains a soul (as a substance dwelling in him, different from the body and, independently upon it, capable of thinking, *id est*, a spiritual substance), or whether life may not rather be a property of matter, if it were in the former manner, no duty of man towards a *body* (as the obliging subject) would, though it is the human body, be cogitable.

I. Only an *objective* division of duties to one's self into the *formal* and *material* of them, therefore, takes place; whereof the one is *limiting* (negative duties) the other *enlarging* (positive duties to one's self) those, which *forbid* man in regard of the *end* of his nature to act contrary to it, consequently refer to the moral *self-preservation* merely, these, which *command* to make a certain object of the arbitrement one's end and refer to the *perfection* of one's self, both of which pertain to virtue, as either duties of forbearance

(*sustine et abstine*), or duties of performance (*viribus concessis utere*), both however as duties of virtue. The former belong to the moral *health* (*ad esse*) of man, as well as the object of his external, as of his internal, sense to the *preservation* of his nature in its perfection (as receptibility). The latter to his moral *wealth* (*ad melius esse; opulentia moralis*), which consists in the possession of a *faculty* sufficient for all ends, so far as this faculty is acquirable and belongs to the *culture* (as an active perfection) of himself. — The first principle of the duty to one's self lies in the sentence, Live conformably to nature (*naturae convenienter vive*), that is, *maintain* thyself in the perfection of thy nature, the second in the position, *Make thyself more perfect*, than mere nature made thee (*perfice te ut finem; perfice te ut medium*).

2. There is a *subjective* division of the duties of man towards himself, *id est*, such a one, according to which the subject of duty (man) contemplates himself, either as an *animal* (physical) and at the same time moral being, or *barely as a moral* one.

The impulses of nature with respect to the *animality* of man are, *a*, that by which nature aims at the preservation of itself, *b*, the preservation of the species, *c*, the preservation of his faculty of the agreeable, though but animal, enjoyment of life. — The vices, which here clash with the duty of man to himself, are, *suicide*, the unnatural use, which one makes of the *inclination to sex*, and the *immoderate taking of food* which enfeebles the faculty of using his powers conformably - to - end.

But as to the duty of man towards himself, *merely* as a moral being (without considering his animality), it consists, *in the formal*, in the consension of the maxims of his will with the *dignity* of the humanity in his person; therefore in the *prohibition*, not to rob himself of the *privilege* of a moral being to act according to principles, *id est*, of internal liberty
and

and thereby to make himself the play of mere inclinations, consequently a thing. — The vices, which are opposite to this duty, are, the *lie*, *avarice*, and the *false humility* (cringing). These adopt principles which (according to the form) directly contradict their character, as moral beings, that is, the internal liberty, the native dignity of man, which is as much as to say that they make it their principle to have no principle, and in this manner no character neither, that is, to throw themselves away and to make themselves an object of contempt. — The virtue, which is opposite to all these vices, might be denominated the *love of honour* (*honestas interna, justum sui estimium*) a cast of mind extremely distinct from *ambition* (that may be very base), but which will in the sequel occur apart under this title.

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ETHICS

PART THE FIRST

ETHICAL ELEMENTAL DOCTRINE

PART THE FIRST

OF THE DUTIES TOWARDS ONE'S SELF IN GENERAL.

BOOK THE FIRST

OF THE PERFECT DUTIES TOWARDS ONE'S SELF.

HEAD THE FIRST

THE DUTY OF MAN TO HIMSELF AS AN ANIMAL



THE *first* though not the chief duty of man towards himself, in the quality of his animality, is the *self-preservation* in his animal nature.

Its contrary is the arbitrable *physical death*, which may be conceived as either total or merely partial. — The physical, *killing* (*autochiria*), may likewise be total (*suicidium*) or partial, *dismembering* (mutilation), which may be the *material*, when one *bereaves* himself of certain constituent *parts*, as organs, that is, mutilates one's self, and the *formal*, when a person *deprives* himself (for ever or for a time) of the *faculty* of the physical (and herewith indirectly of the moral) *use* of his powers.

As under this head negative duties only, consequently but forbearances, are handled, the article of duty must be levelled at the *vices*, which are opposed to the duty towards one's self.

HEAD THE FIRST

ARTICLE THE FIRST

Of Suicide.

6.

THE arbitrable *killing* of one's self can then only first be named *self-murder* (*homicidium dolosum*), when it can be proved that it is in general a crime, which is perpetrated either on one's own person, or by this killing of one's self on others (for instance, when a pregnant person puts herself to death).

a. Suicide is a crime (murder). This may now be considered as a transgression of one's duty towards other men (married people, parents towards children, the subject either to his sovereign, or to his fellow-citizens, finally towards God, who hath intrusted us in the world with a post, which man quits, without being called from it); — the violation of a duty to one's self, however, is but the subject in agitation, though, setting aside all those considerations, man is bound by his quality as a person merely to the preservation of his life, and must herein acknowledge a duty (and indeed a strict one) towards himself.

It seems absurd that man can injure himself (*volenti non fit injuria*). Hence the Stoic held it a privilege of his (of the sage's) personality, to go out of life (as out of a smoky room) at pleasure with composure, without being urged by either present or apprehended evil; because he could be of no further use in it. — But even this bravery, this strength of soul, not to fear death and to know something, which man can value even higher than his life, must have been still a greater motive to him not to destroy himself, a being of such superior potency and having power over the strongest

strongest sensitive springs, consequently not to rob himself of life.

Man cannot divest himself of his personality, as long as duties are in question, therefore as long as he lives, and it is a contradiction, to have the moral faculty of withdrawing himself from every obligation, *id est*, of freely acting in such a manner, as if he required for this action no moral faculty at all. To annul the subject of morality in his own person, is just as much as to extirpate from the world, as far as he can, morality itself which, according to its existence, is an end in itself; consequently to dispose of himself as a bare mean to any end he pleases, signifies to degrade the humanity in his person (*homo noumenon*), which is however intrusted to man (*homo phaenomenon*) for preservation.

To bereave one's self of a constituent part as an organ (to mutilate one's self), for example, to give away or to sell a tooth, with a view of planting it in the jaw of another, or to allow one's self to be castrated, in order to be able to live more commodiously &c. pertains to the partial self-murder; but not an organ, mortified or threatening mortification and so detrimental to life, by amputation, or to permit, for instance, one's hair, which it is true is a part, but no organ of the body, to be cut, can be accounted a crime against one's own person; though the latter case, when external gain is aimed at, is not entirely inculpable.

Casuistical Questions.

Is it self-murder to plunge one's self (as Curtius did) into certain death, in order to save one's native country? — or Is the designed martyrdom, to offer one's self up as a sacrifice for the welfare of the human race in general, to be considered like the former action as an act of heroism?

Is it allowed to prevent by suicide the unjust

sentence of death by one's sovereign — even were he to permit it to be done (as Nero did Seneca)?

Can a great monarch lately deceased be charged with a criminal intention, because he carried with him a very active poison, probably with a view, should he be taken prisoner during the war, which he carried on personally, not to be obliged to grant conditions of ransom, which might be hurtful to his kingdom; for this design may, without being under the necessity of presuming in this mere pride, be attributed to him?

A certain person was sensible of an approaching hydrophobia, as an effect of the bite of a mad dog, and, having never heard of any one's being cured of that disease, put an end to his own existence, in order, as he declared in a writing he left, not to occasion in his canine madness (of which he already felt the attack) a misfortune to others too; the question is, Whether in this he did wrong?

Whoever resolves to allow himself to be inoculated for the smallpox, hazards his life on an uncertainty, though he, in hopes of obtaining a milder sort of smallpox than what is commonly produced by infection, does it in order to *preserve his life*, and is so far in a much more doubtful case of the law of duty, than the mariner, who at least does not occasion the tempest, to which he commits himself, instead of which the other brings on himself the disease that puts him in danger of his life. Is inoculation then allowed?

ARTICLE THE SECOND.

Of Onanism, or libidinous Self-pollution.

As the love of life is destined by nature for the preservation of the *person*, so is the love of sex for that of the *species*; *id est*, each of them is an *end of nature*, by which is understood that connexion
of

of the cause with an effect, in which that, even without attributing an understanding to it, is thought as producing men, but this according to the analogy with an understanding, therefore as if designedly. It may now be asked, whether the use of the latter faculty, with regard to the person himself, who exercises it, ranks under a limiting law of duty, or whether he, even without intending that end, be entitled to devote the use of his properties of sex to mere animal pleasure, without thereby acting contrary to a duty towards himself. — In law it is proved that one cannot use *another* person to gratify this pleasure, without particular limitation by a juridical compact; when two persons oblige one another reciprocally. Here however is the question, Whether in regard of this enjoyment there exist a duty of man to himself, whose transgression is a *pollution* (not merely a degradation) of the humanity in his own person? The instinct to that enjoyment is named carnal pleasure (also voluptuousness). The vice, which is thereby generated, is termed unchastity, but the virtue with respect to this sensitive impulse chastity, which shall now be here represented as a duty of man towards himself. Voluptuousness is named *unnatural*, when one is stimulated to it, not by the actual object, but by the image of it, therefore as contrary-to-end, creating it one's self. For it then produces a desire contrary to the end of nature, and indeed one still more important, than even that of the love of life is, because this aims but at the preservation of the individual, but that at that of the whole species. —

That such an use contrary to nature (therefore abuse) of one's property of sex is a violation of the duty to *one's self* jarring in the highest degree with morality, directly strikes every body at once with the thought of it, and excites such aversion to this thought, that the very distinguishing of such a vice by

by its own name is holden immoral, which does not take place with respect to that of suicide, which man hesitates not in the least to expose to the world with all its horrors (in a *species facti*); as if man in general felt himself ashamed to be capable of such a treatment of his own person degrading him even beneath the brutes; insomuch that even the licit (in itself indeed merely animal) bodily commerce of both sexes in marriage occasions great delicacy in the civilized intercourse and, when it is mentioned, requires a veil to be thrown over it.

But the proof of reason of the inadmissibleness of that unnatural use, and even of that use, which is merely disconformable-to-end, of ones properties of sex as a violation (and, as to the former, in the highest degree) of the duty to one's self, is not so easily made. — The *argument* is, that man gives up (throws away) his personality, by using himself as a bare mean of the gratification of animal instinct. But the supreme degree of the violation of the humanity in his own person by such a vice in its unnaturalness, as it, according to the form (the mindedness), seems even to transcend that of suicide, is thereby not explained. It must then be that, as the daring throwing away of one's self in the latter, as a burthen of life, is at least not a weak yielding to animal allurements, but requires bravery, where reverence for the humanity in one's own person has always place, he, who gives himself up entirely to animal inclination, makes of man a thing to be enjoyed, but herein at the same time a thing contrary to nature, *id est*, a *disgusting* object, and thus deprives himself of all reverence for himself.

Casuistical Questions.

THE end of nature in the cohabitation of the sexes is propagation, that is, the preservation of the species; one therefore must not at least act contrary to that end.

end. But is it allowed, *without having regard to that*, to lay claim (even were it in matrimony) to that cohabitation?

To make use of one's properties of sex during pregnancy, or in case of sterility in the woman (on account of age or disease), or when she has no further incitement thereto, is it not, in either the one or the other party, just as repugnant, as the unnatural voluptuousness, to the end of nature and herewith to the duty to one's self; or is there here a permissive law of the morally practical reason, which in the collision of its determinatives renders something, in itself indeed illicit, yet for the obviating of a still greater trespass (as if indulgently), licit? — Where can one begin to number the limitation of a large obligation with *purism* (pedantry with respect to the observance of duty, as to its extent), and to grant, with the risk of quitting the law of reason, a latitude to the animal inclinations?

The inclination to sex is named *love* (in the strictest signification of the word) and is in fact the greatest pleasure of sense, possible in an object; — not merely *sensible* pleasure, as in objects, which please in the bare reflection on them, (as the receptibility of it (sensible pleasure) is denominated taste) but the pleasure from the *enjoyment* of another person, which therefore belongs to the *appetitive faculty*, and indeed to the highest step of it, passion. It cannot however be counted either love of complacency, or that of benevolence; (for both rather withhold from carnal enjoyment) but is a pleasure of a peculiar sort (*sui generis*) and the being smitten with love has properly speaking nothing in common with the moral love, though it (pleasure) may enter into a close alliance with the moral love, when practical reason with its limiting conditions is superadded.

ARTICLE THE THIRD.

Of Self-obstupefaction by Intemperance in the Use of either Food or Means of Enjoyment.

8.

THE vice of this species of excess is here judged from neither the hurt, nor the bodily pain (of the diseases), which man thereby draws on himself; for that would be a principle of wellbeing and of agreeableness (consequently of felicity), whereby it should be counteracted, but which can never ground a duty, but only a rule of prudence: at least it were no principle of a direct duty.

The brutal excess in the taking of nourishment is the abuse of the means of enjoyment, whereby the faculty of their intellectual use is either clogged or exhausted. *Drunkenness* and *gluttony* are the vices, which belong to this rubric. In the state of ebriety a man is to be treated as a beast only, but not as a man, and by the glutting with food he is, in such a condition, for a certain time lamed for the actions, to which both activity and reflection are required in the use of his powers. — It is self-evident that to put one's self into such a state, is a violation of the duty to one's self. The former of these debasements, even beneath the animal nature, is commonly occasioned by fermented liquors, and any the like stupefying and soporific means, such as opium and other productions of the vegetable kingdom, and becomes seducing by causing for a while visionary happiness and freedom from care, nay, even imaginary strength, but dejection, weakness and, what is the worst, necessity of repeating this mean of obstupefaction, ay, even of encreasing it, are induced. Gluttony is so far still beneath that animal sensual delectation, that it occupies the sense merely as a passive disposition, but not the imagination, which com-
prises

prises an *active* play of the representations, as is the case in the abovementioned enjoyment; consequently approaches yet nearer to that of the brute.

Casuistical Questions.

MAY one, though not as a panegyrist, at least as an apologist, permit a use of wine, which almost borders on inebriation; because it animates conversation in society, and therewith combines candour. — Or may one even allow it the merit to promote what Seneca boasts of Cato, *virtus ejus incalvit mero*? — The use of opium and of spirituous liquours, as means of enjoyment, is nearer meanness, because it, from the imaginary wellbeing, renders mute, reserved and incommunicative, therefore is not allowed but as a remedy. — But who can determine the *measure* for one, who is just ready to make the transition to the state, wherein he does not see clearly any longer to *measure*? Mahometanism, which totally prohibits wine, has then made a very bad choice, to permit opium in its stead.

The feast, however, as a formal invitation to intemperance in both sorts of enjoyments, has, besides the merely physical luxury, still something in it tending to the moral end, namely, to keep a number of men long together for the purpose of mutual communication: but as the number (when it, as lord Chesterfield says, * exceeds that of the muses) allows but a small communication (with those who sit near one another), consequently the preparation contradicts that end, it always remains a seduction to that which is immoral, namely, intemperance, the transgression of the duty to one's self; without considering the physical hurt from the surfeit, which may perhaps be removed by the physician. How far extends

* His lordship was not the first who said this; in confirmation of which assertion *vide* Gellius XIII, 2.

extends the moral faculty to listen to these invitations to intemperance?

HEAD THE SECOND.

THE DUTY OF MAN TOWARDS HIMSELF, MERELY AS A MORAL BEING

It is opposed to the vices, the *Lie*, *Avarice* and *false Humility* (cringing).

1.

Of the Lie.

9.

THE greatest violation of the duty of man towards himself, contemplated as a moral being merely (the humanity in his person), is the contrary of veracity, the lie (*aliud lingua promptum, aliud pectore inclusum gerere*). That every designed untruth in uttering one's thoughts cannot avoid this hard name (which it bears in law, only when it violates others' right) in ethics, which can derive no moral faculty from innocuousness, is perfectly obvious. For the dishonour (to be an object of moral contempt), which accompanies that untruth, accompanies the liar too, like his shadow. The lie may be either an external (*mendacium externum*), or an internal one. — By that he renders himself an object of contempt in the eyes of others, but by this, which is still more, in his own, and violates the dignity of the humanity in his own person; whereby the hurt, which may arise therefrom to other men, does not concern that which is peculiar to vice, (for in that case it would consist in the violation of the duty towards others merely) and therefore does not come into consideration here, nay, not even the hurt, which he does himself; for then it would clash, as merely a prudential

dential fault, with the pragmatistical, but not with the moral, maxim, and could by no means be looked upon as a violation of duty. — The lie is the throwing away and, so to speak, the annihilation of one's human dignity. A man, who does not believe himself what he says to another (were it even a merely ideal person), has still a smaller value, than if he were a thing merely; for of its property to be serviceable, another may, as it is something actual and given, make some one use or another; but the communication of his thoughts to any person by words, which contain (designedly) the contrary of what the speaker thinks, is an end directly opposite to the natural conformity-to-end of his faculty of the communication of his thoughts, consequently a giving up of his personality, and a merely illusory phenomenon of man, but not the man himself. — *Veracity* in declarations is also named *honour* and, when these are at the same time promises, *probity*, but in general *sincerity*.

The lie (in the ethical sense of the word), as a designed untruth in general, does not even require to be *hurtful* to others, in order to be declared repudiable; for in that case it were a violation of the rights of others. Mere levity, or very often good nature, may be the cause of it, nay, even a real good end may be thereby intended, yet the mode of yielding to it is by the mere form a crime of man against his own person, and a baseness which must render him contemptible in his own eyes.

To prove the actuality of many *internal* lies of which men are guilty, is easy, but to explain their possibility, seems to be more difficult; because a second person, whom one has the design to deceive, is thereto requisite, but to beguile one's self intentionally, appears to involve a contradiction.

Man, as a moral being (*homo noumenon*) cannot use himself, as a physical being (*homo phenomenon*).

as a bare mean (a speaking-machine), which is not bound to the internal end (the communication of thoughts), but is bound to the condition of the consonance with the declaration of the former, and under an obligation to *veracity* towards himself. — Thus it is when he, for instance, pretends a belief in a future judge of the world, while he actually finds no such in himself, but, persuading himself that it can do no harm, but may rather be of use, to acknowledge such a one in thought to a knower of hearts, with a view at all events to obtain his favour by playing the hypocrite; or when he is not in doubt on that account, but flatters himself with internal veneration for his law, as he feels no other springs, than those of the fear of punishment.

Improbability is merely a want of *conscientiousness*, *id est*, purity of the profession in presence of one's *internal* judge, who is conceived as another person, when this purity is contemplated in its greatest strictness, when a wish (out of philanthropy) is taken for the act, as it has an end good in itself in view, and the internal lie, though it is contrary to the duty of man towards himself, obtains here the name of weakness, in the same manner as the wish of a lover to find nothing but good properties in his mistress, renders her visible faults invisible to him. — But this impurity in declarations, which one makes to himself, merits a serious reprehension, because, from such a rotten place (the falsehood, which seems to have taken root in human nature), when once the chief principle of veracity is violated, the evil of the want of veracity spreads itself likewise in reference to other men. —

Annotation.

It is remarkable that the bible doth not date the first crime, whereby the bad came into the world, from the *fratricide* (of Cain), but from the first *lie*, (because

(because nature revolts against that) and as the author of all bad names it, the liar from the beginning and the father of lies; though reason can give no further ground of this propensity of men to simulation (*esprit fourbe*), which must, however, have preceded; because an act of liberty cannot like a physical effect be deduced and explained according to the law of nature of the connexion of the effect with its cause, all of which are phenomena.

Casuistical Questions.

CAN an untruth out of mere politeness (for instance, the *most obedient humble servant* at the conclusion of a letter) be considered as a lie? Nobody is thereby deceived. — An author asks one of his readers, How does my work please you? The answer might indeed be made in an illusory manner; by jeering at such a captious question; but who has wit always ready? The smallest delay of the answer is a mortification to the author; may the reader then humour him?

In actual affairs, where the *meum* and *tuum* are concerned, when I tell an untruth, must I be responsible for all the consequences, which may be produced? for example, a master gave orders to his servant, if a certain person should call on him, to say he is not at home. The servant does this, and thereby occasions the master's escape, who commits a great crime, which would otherwise have been prevented by the guard sent to take him up. On whom here does the blame fall (according to ethical principles)? Without doubt on the servant, who by a lie violated a duty towards himself; whose consequences are now imputed to him by his own conscience.

II.

Of Avarice.

By this name I do not understand the *avarice greedy of gain* (the extension of one's acquisition of the means of living well beyond the bounds of the real wants); for this may be considered as a mere violation of one's duty (of beneficence) towards others; nor the *penurious avarice* which, when it is dishonourable, is termed *niggardliness*, and yet can be nothing but the neglect of one's duties of love towards others; but the coarctation of *one's own* enjoyment of the means of the *vita suavis* within the measure of the real proper necessities, it is this avarice, which collides with the duty towards *one's self*, that is here meant.

Mentioning this vice an example of the erroneousness of every explanation of virtues as well as of vices by the mere *degree* may be made distinct, and at the same time the uselessness of the *Aristotelian* principle, That virtue consists in the medium between two vices, shown.

If between prodigality and avarice I consider the *good husbandry* as the mean, and this shall be the mean of the *degree*; a vice could not pass to an (*contrarie*) opposite vice, but through *virtue*, and this would be nothing but a diminished, or rather an evanescent, vice, and the consequence in the present case were, That to make no use at all of the means of living well, is the genuine duty of virtue.

Not the *measure* of the exercise of moral maxims, but their objective *principle*, must, if vice shall be distinguished from virtue, be cognised and propounded as distinct. — The *maxim* of the avarice *greedy of gain* (as of a prodigal) is, To provide and to preserve all means of living well *for the purpose of enjoyment*. — That of the *penurious* avarice, on the contrary, is as well the acquisition, as the preservation

tion of all means of living well, but *without regard to the enjoyment*, (*id est*, not this, but the possession only, is the end).

The proper criterion of the latter vice, therefore, is the principle of the possession of the means to all sorts of ends, yet with the reservation, not to be willing to use any of them for one's self and thus to deprive one's self of the agreeable enjoyment of life; which with respect to the end is directly contrary to the duty towards one's self. * Prodigality and

E 3

penurious-

* The position, One ought to do nothing either too much or too little, expresses nothing; for it is tautological. What is the meaning of, to do too much? To do more than is good; What means, to do too little? To do less than is good. What signifies, I ought (to do or to forbear something)? It is *not good* (contrary to duty) to do either *more* or *less*, than is good. If that is the wisdom, to investigate which we are to return to the ancients (to Aristotle), as those, who were nearer the source, *virtus consistet in medio, medium tenere beati, est modus in rebus, sunt certi denique fines, quos ultra citraque nequit consistere rectum*, we have made a bad choice indeed, to address ourselves to their oracle. — Between veracity and mendacity (as *contradictorie oppositis*) there is no medium; but by all means between candour and reserve (as *contrarie oppositis*), as in him, who declares his opinion, *all* that he says, is true, but he does not tell the *whole truth*. It is however quite natural to require of the teacher of virtue to point out this medium to me. But that he cannot do; for both duties of virtue have a latitude of application and, what is to be done can be decided but by judgement according to rules of prudence (the pragmatical), not by those of morality, *id est*, not as *strict* duty (*officium strictum*), but only as *large* (*officium latum*). Hence he, who observes the principles of virtue, can commit a *fault* (*peccatum*), it is true, in the exercise more or less, than prudence prescribes, but by being strictly attached to these principles not practice a *vice* (*vitium*), and Horace's verse, *insani sapiens nomen habeat æquus iniqui, ultra quam satis est virtutem si petat ipsam*, is, literally taken, absolutely false.

penuriousness, consequently, are not discrepant from one another in the degree, but specifically by opposite maxims.

Casuistical Questions.

THE duties towards one's self only are at present the subject in agitation; inordinate thirst of gain (insatiableness in acquiring) in order to waste, as well as sordidness (painfulness in spending), bottoms upon *solipsism* (*solipsismus*), and both, prodigality as well as penuriousness, seem to be rejectable merely because they tend to poverty, the one not expected, and the other arbitrable, (willing to live poorly), — thus the query, Whether they, as well the one as the other, are to be named vices in general and not rather both mere imprudence, consequently may not lie entirely without the bounds of the duty to one's self? But penuriousness is not a merely mistaken frugality, but a slavish subjection of one's self to the goods of fortune, not to be superior to them, which is a violation of the duty to one's self. It is opposite to the *liberality* (*liberalitas moralis*) of the cast of mind in general (not to generosity or munificence (*liberalitas sumtuosa*), which is but the application of it to a particular case), *id est*, the principle of independence upon every thing, except the law, and a defraudation, which the subject commits on himself. But what sort of a law is that, whose internal legislator

false. *Sapiens* here signifies but a *judicious* man, who does not phantastically conceive perfection of virtue, which, as an ideal, requires indeed the approximation to this end, but not the completion that is without the reach of the human powers, and introduces nonsense (phantastry) into their principle. For to be *too virtuous*, that is, to be too much attached to one's duty, would be nearly to the same purpose, as to make either a circle too circular, or a straight line too straight.

lator himself does not know when it is to be applied? Shall I deprive myself of the necessities of life, or only abstain from outward expence? whether in advanced life, or in youth? or is frugality in general a virtue?

III.

Of the false Humility.

II.

MAN in the system of nature (*homo phaenomenon*, *animal rationale*) is a being of little significancy and has in common with other animals, as productions of the earth, a vulgar price. Though he, having understanding, has the advantage of them, and can lay down ends to himself, that gives him but an *external* value of his utility (*pretium usus*), namely, one man in preference to another, *id est*, a price, as goods, in the traffic with these animals as things, where he has yet a lower value, than the universal mean of exchange, money, whose value is on that account termed distinguished (*pretium eminens*).

But man contemplated as a *person*, *id est*, a subject of a morally practical reason, is above all price; for as such an one (*homo noumenon*) he is not to be esteemed as a mean barely to the ends of others, nay, not even to his own, but as an end in itself, that is, he possesses a *dignity* (an absolute intrinsic value) whereby he extorts *reverence* for himself from all other rational beings of the world, and can measure and consider himself on the footing of equality with every other of this species.

The humanity in his person is the object of the reverence, which he can demand from every other man; which he however must not forfeit. He therefore can and ought to measure himself according to

a small, as well as a great measure, accordingly as he contemplates himself, either as a being of senses (according to his animal nature), or as an intelligible being (according to his moral predisposition). As he must however consider himself, not only as a person, but as a man, that is, a person, who has duties incumbent on him, which his own reason imposes on him, so his inconsiderableness as an *animal man* cannot prove derogatory from the consciousness of his dignity as a *man of reason*, and he ought not to abnegate the moral self-estimation in consideration of the latter, *id est*, he ought to aspire and to strive to his end, which is in itself duty, not in a cringing manner, not *servilely* (*animo servili*), as if soliciting favour, not disown his dignity, but always preserve the consciousness of the sublimity of his moral predisposition (which is contained in the conception of virtue) and this *self-estimation* is a duty of man to himself. The consciousness and feeling of the inconsiderableness of his moral value *in comparison of the LAW* is *humility* (*humilitas moralis*). The persuasion of a greatness of his value, but only from want of comparison with the law, may be named the *pride of virtue* (*arrogantia moralis*). — The giving up of all pretensions to any moral value of one's self, in the persuasion just by that to acquire for one's self a borrowed one, is the morally spurious *humility*.

Humility in comparison of other men (ay, in general any one finite being whatever, were it even a Seraph) is no duty at all; but rather the effort in this relation to equal others, or to surpass them, with the persuasion thereby to procure one's self an intrinsic greater value is *highmindedness*, which is directly contrary to the duty towards others. But the debasing of one's own moral value devised as a mean barely to acquire the favour of another (whoever he be)

be) (hypocrisy and flattery) * is false (feigned) humility and, as a degradation of one's personality, opposite to the duty to one's self.

Of our sincere and exact comparison with the moral law (its sanctity and strictness) true humbleness must inevitably be the consequence: But of our being capable of such an internal legislation, of the (physical) man's feeling himself compelled to honour the (moral) man in his own person, at once *exaltation* and the highest *self-estimation*, as feeling his intrinsic value (*valor*), according to which he cannot be sold for any price, and possesses an inamissible dignity (*dignitas interna*), which inspires him with reverence for himself.

I2.

This duty, in reference to the dignity of the humanity in us, consequently to ourselves, may be rendered more or less knowable by the following examples:

Become not a slave to men; — Let not others trample upon thy right unresented. — Contract no debts, for which thou canst not give full security. — Accept of no favours, which thou canst do without, and be neither a parasite, nor a flatterer, nor (which indeed is different from these but in the degree) a beggar. Be therefore economical, that thou mayst not become poor as a beggar. — Complaining and moaning, even mere crying on account of bodily pain is unworthy of thee, and the most so, when thou art

E 5

conscious

* The following note is merely etymological. *Heucheln* (eigentlich häucheln) scheint vom ächzenden, die Sprache unterbrechenden Hauch (Stoßseufzer), abgeleitet zu seyn; dagegen *Schmeicheln* vom *Schmiegen*, welches, als Habitus, *Schmiegeeln* und endlich von den Hochdeutschen *Schmeicheln* genannt worden ist, abzustammen.

conscious to thyself of having occasioned it: Hence the ennoblement (the averting of the ignominy) of the death of a delinquent by the firmness with which he dies. — Kneeling or prostration, even with a view thereby to render sensible the adoration of celestial objects, is contrary to the dignity of man, as also the invoking of them in present images; for then thou humblest thyself, not before an *ideal*, which thy own reason represents to thee, but before an *idol*, which is thy own handiwork.

Casuistical Questions.

IN man is not the feeling of the sublimity of his destination, *id est*, the *elevation of mind* (*elatio animi*) as an estimation of himself, too nearly connected with the *self-conceit* (*arrogantia*), which is directly opposed to the true *humbleness* (*humilitas moralis*), to be adviseable to encourage that; even in comparison of other men, not merely of the law? or would not this sort of self-denial rather prompt others to slight our persons in their judgments, and thus be contrary to the duty to (the reverence for) ourselves? Bowing, fawning and cringing to a man seem in every case to be unworthy of a man.

The chief testimony of reverence in both words and manners, even towards one not commanding in the civil constitution — the reverences, compliments, polite phrases denoting with solicitous punctuality the distinction of ranks, — which are totally different from the politeness (that is likewise necessary to those, holding themselves equal), — the *Du*, *Er*, *Ihr*, and *Sie*, or *Eu. Wobledlen*, *Hochedeln*, *Hochedelgebobrnen*, *Wohlgebobrnen* * (*obe, jam satis est*) in accosting — this pedantry the Germans of all nations upon earth (the Indian tribes perhaps excepted) have

* *Sir* happily corresponds, in general, to all these different forms of salutation and degrees of reverence.

have carried the farthest, Are not these proofs of a great propensity to creeping among men? (*Hae nugae in seria ducunt*). But whoever makes a reptile of himself, cannot complain if he should afterwards be trodden upon.

SECTION THE FIRST.

OF THE DUTY OF MAN TO HIMSELF, AS THE
NATURAL JUDGE OF HIMSELF.

12.

EVERY one conception of duty contains an objective necessitation by the law (as a moral imperative limiting our liberty) and belongs to the practical understanding, which gives the rule; but the internal *imputation* of an act, as a case ranking under the law (*in meritum aut demeritum*) belongs to *judgment* (*judicium*) which, as the subjective principle of the imputation of the action, judges in a valid manner whether or not it happened as an act (an action ranking under a law); on which then follows the conclusion of *reason* (the sentence), *id est*, a connexion of the juridical effect with the action (the condemnation or the acquittal) all which takes place before *judgment* (*coram judicio*), as a moral person denominated *court* (*forum*) procuring effect to the law. — The consciousness of an *internal court* in man (before which his thoughts either accuse or exculpate themselves) is CONSCIENCE.

Every person has conscience, and finds himself observed by an internal judge, threatened and in general kept in respect (reverence combined with fear), and this power in him watching over the laws is nothing, which he *makes* himself (arbitrably), but is incorporated in his very being. It accompanies him

him like his shadow, when he thinks of running away. He may indeed, by pleasure and dissipation, either stupify himself, or set himself asleep, but cannot avoid now and then recovering himself, or awaking, when he immediately hears its tremendous voice. He may, in his most abandoned state, come to that pass, not to mind it at all any more, but cannot avoid *hearing* it.

This original intellectual and (because it is a representation of duty) moral predisposition, named *conscience*, has what is peculiar to itself, that, though its affair is an affair of man with himself, he finds himself necessitated by his reason to carry it on as if by the orders of *another person*. For the matter here is the conducting of a *process (causa) coram judicio*. But that the *accused* by his conscience is represented as *the very same person* as the judge, is an absurd mode of representation of a court of judicature; for in that case the accuser would always be certain to lose. — The conscience of man, therefore, must in all duties conceive *another* (as man in general) than himself to be the judge of his actions, if it shall not be in contradiction with itself; this other may be, either a real, or an ideal, person, whom reason creates to itself.*

Such

* The twofold personality, in which man, who accuses and judges himself in conscience, must conceive himself, this double self, on the one side, to be obliged to stand trembling at the bar of a court, which is however intrusted to himself, but on the other side, to have in his own possession the office of judge as an innate authority, requires an exposition, that reason may not fall into a contradiction with itself. — I, the accuser and yet the accused also, am the very same *man (numero idem)*, but, as the subject of the moral legislation issuing from the conception of liberty, when man is subject to a law, which he gives himself (*homo noumenon*), he is to be contemplated as another than a man of senses endowed with reason (*specie diversus*), but

Such an ideal person (the authorised judge of conscience) must be a knower of hearts; for the court is holden *within the breast* of man — he however must at the same time be *all-obliging* too, *id est*, such a person, or conceived as such an one, in relation to which all duties in general are to be considered as his commandments also; because conscience is the internal judge of all free actions. — — As such a moral being must at the same time have all power (in heaven and upon earth), because he could not else procure his laws the suitable effect (which belongs of necessity to the office of judge), such a moral being, however, having omnipotence is named God; so conscience must be thought as the subjective principle of an account to be rendered to God of one's deeds; nay, the latter conception will always be comprehended (though but in an obscure manner) in that moral self-consciousness.

This does not mean that man, by the idea, to which his conscience inevitably leads him, is entitled, and still less *bound*, to *assume* without himself such a supreme being as *actual*; for it (the idea) is not given him *objectively*, by the theoretical reason, but merely *subjectively*, by the practical obliging itself to act conformably to it; and man obtains by means of this,

but only in a practical consideration. — for there is no theory of the causal relation of the *intelligibilis* to the *sensibilis* — and this specifical distinction is that of the faculties of man (the superior and inferiour), which characterise him. The former is the plaintiff, against whom a juridical assistance to the defendant (his counsel) is granted. After the conclusion of the writings of the case the judge within the breast, as the person *having potency*, passes sentence on either felicity, or misery, as moral consequences of the action; in which quality we cannot follow his potency (as Ruler of the world) any farther with our reason, but only regard with awe the unconditional *jubeo* or *veto*.

this, *only according to the analogy* with a legislator of all rational beings of the world, a mere guidance to represent to himself conscientiousness (which is also termed *religio*) as an accountableness to a sacred being, distinct from himself, indeed, but yet most intimately present with him (the morally legislative reason) and to submit himself to its will, the rules of justice. The conception of religion in general is here for man, Merely a principle of the judgment of all his duties *as* divine commandments.

I. In a matter of conscience (*causa conscientiam tangens*) man conceives a *monitory* conscience (*præmonens*) antecedent to the resolution; whereby the greatest scrupulosity, when a conception of duty (something in itself moral) is concerned, in cases, of which conscience is the sole judge (*casibus conscientiae*), is not judged to be micrology and a real trespass a bagatelle (*peccatillum*), and (according to the principle, *nimia non curat prætor*) cannot be left to an arbitrarily speaking counsellor of conscience. Hence to ascribe to any one a *large* conscience, is as much, as to say that *he has no conscience at all.* —

2. When the act is resolved upon, the *plaintiff* first presents himself in the conscience, but at the same time with him an *advocate*; whereby the contest is not settled amicably (*per amicabilem compositionem*), but must be decided according to the strictness of the law; and on this follows

3. the sentence of conscience, valid in law, on man, either to *acquit*, or to *condemn* him, which makes the conclusion; by which it is to be observed that the former can never decree a *reward* (*præmium*), as a profit of something, which was not his before, but only contain a *being glad* to have escaped the danger of being found guilty, and hence the felicity, in the consolatory address of his conscience, is not *positive* (as joy), but only *negative* (composure, after anxiety), which can be attributed but to virtue,
as

as a combat against the influence of the bad principle in man.

SECTION THE SECOND.

OF THE FIRST COMMANDMENT OF ALL THE DUTIES TOWARDS ONE'S SELF.

14.

THIS is, *Cognise* (search, penetrate, into) *thyself*, not according to thy physical perfection (the fitness and unfitness for all ends either agreeable to the, or commanded), but according to the moral, relative to thy duty — thy heart — whether it be good or bad, whether the source of thy actions be pure or impure, and what, as either originally pertaining to the *substance* of man, or as derived (acquired or drawn on him), can be imputed to himself and may belong to the moral *state*.

The moral self-cognition, to which is requisite to dive into the depths (abyss) of the heart so difficult to be fathomed, is the beginning of all human wisdom. For the latter, which consists in the agreement of the will of a being with the scope, requires in men first the removing of the internal impediments (of a bad will nestled in him), and then the unfolding of the inamissible original predisposition of a good will in him, (only the descent to hell of the self-cognition paves the way to an apotheosis).

15.

This moral self-cognition, in the first place, banishes the *enthusiastical* contempt of one's self, as man (of his whole race) in general; for it contradicts itself. — It cannot take place but by the excellent predisposition to the good, found in us, which makes

makes man worthy of reverence, that he finds the man, who acts contrary to this, (himself, but not the humanity in him) contemptible. — But, in the next place it resists the self-esteem *from philauty*, to hold mere wishes, let them be made with ever so much longing, as they are and always remain void of all act, proofs of a good heart (*prayer* is but an internal wish declared to a knower of hearts). Impartiality in judging one's self, in comparison of the law, and sincerity in the self-acknowledgments and confessions of one's internal moral worthiness and unworthiness, are duties to one's self, which immediately flow from that first commandment of self-cognition.

EPISODICAL SECTION.

OF THE AMPHIBOLY OF THE MORAL CONCEPTIONS
OF REFLECTION: TO HOLD THAT, WHICH
IS DUTY OF MAN TO HIMSELF, DUTY
TO OTHERS.

16.

To judge according to bare reason, man has no other duty, than merely towards man (himself or another); for his duty to any one subject is the moral necessitation by his will. The necessitating (obliging) subject must therefore, first, be a person, secondly, this person must be given as an object of experience; because man is to act with a view to the end of his will, which can take place but in the relation of two existing beings to one another (for a mere creature of the mind cannot become the *cause* of any one effect according to ends). But we, with all our experience, know no other being, which

which is capable of obligation (either active or passive), than man. Man therefore can have no duty to any being, but merely to man, and, should he represent to himself having such a duty, it happens by the *amphiboly of the conceptions of reflection*, and his putative duty to other beings is duty towards himself merely; to which misunderstanding he is led by permuting his duty *with regard* to other beings with duty *towards* these beings.

This reputed duty may be referred to objects, either *not persons*, or persons but absolutely *invisible* (not possible to be exhibited to the external senses) — The former (*extrabuman*) can be, either the mere substance of nature, or that part of nature organized for propagation but insensible, or that part of nature endowed with both sensation and arbitrement (minerals, plants, animals); the latter (*superhuman*) may be cogitated as spiritual beings (angels, God). — Whether a relation of duty between beings of both sorts and men has place, and what this may be, are now the questions?

17.

With respect to the *beautiful* though but inanimate in nature a propension to mere destroying (*spiritus destructionis*) is contrary to the duty of man towards himself, because it either weakens or extinguishes that feeling in man which, it is true, is not of itself only moral, but yet is that attuning of the sensitive faculty, which is very favourable to morality, at least prepares for it, namely, to love something even without a view to profit (for instance, beautiful crystallizations, the beauty of the vegetable kingdom that beggars all description).

As to the living though reasonless class of creatures, the duty of abstaining from the violent and at the same time cruel treatment of animals is much more intimately connected with the duty of man to

himself, because thereby the sympathy with their suffering becomes rebated in man and a very serviceable natural predisposition to morality, in relation to other men, weakened and by degrees destroyed; though the quick killing of animals (done without torment), and also their labour, only not forced beyond their strength, (such labour must even men consent to) belong to the moral faculties of man; whereas the torturing physical experiments, for the mere purpose of speculation, when the end can be attained without them, are abominable. — Even gratitude for the long services of either an old horse, or an old dog (as if they were domestic companions) pertains *indirectly* to the duty of man, namely, *in respect* of these animals, *directly* contemplated, however, it never is but duty of man *towards* himself.

18.

With regard to what lies totally beyond the bounds of our experience, but yet according to its possibility is found in our ideas, *exempli gratia*, to the idea of God, we have equally a duty, which is denominated a *duty of religion*, namely, That of the cognition of all our duties *as (instar)* divine commandments, But this is not the consciousness of a duty *towards* God. For, as this idea arises from our own reason entirely and, whether it be in a theoretical view, to explain to ourselves the conformity-to-end in the universe, or to serve for a spring in our conduct, is *framed* by ourselves, we have not in this a given being before us, *to* whom an obligation is incumbent on us; for in that case his actuality would need to be first evinced by experience (revealed); but it is a duty of man to himself to apply this idea, unavoidably presenting itself to reason, to the moral law in
us,

us, where it is of the greatest moral fertility. In this (*practical*) sense it may therefore run thus, To have religion is a duty of man towards himself.

BOOK THE SECOND

OF THE IMPERFECT DUTIES OF MAN TOWARDS HIMSELF (IN REGARD TO HIS END).

SECTION THE FIRST

OF THE DUTY TO ONE'S SELF IN BOTH DEVELOPING AND INCREASING ONE'S PERFECTION OF NATURE, THAT IS, WITH A PRAGMATICAL VIEW.

19.

THE culture of one's powers of nature (powers of the spirit, of the soul and of the body), as means to all possible ends is a duty of man towards himself. — Man owes it to himself (as a being of reason), not to leave unemployed and, as it were, to rust the predispositions and faculties of nature, which his reason may one day or other make use of, but, suppose he may be contented even with the innate measure of his faculty for the natural wants, yet his reason must first show by principles this *being contented* with the small measure of his faculties, because he, as a being, who is capable of ends (to make objects his end), must owe the use of his powers, not merely to the instinct of nature, but to the liberty, with which he determines this measure. It is not therefore the consideration of the *profit*, which the culture of his faculties (for all sorts of ends) may yield; for this consideration would perhaps (according to Rousseau's principles) fall out advantageously for the rudeness of the necessities of life; but it is the commandment of the morally practical reason and a *duty* of man towards himself to cultivate his faculties

ties (one of which more than the others, according to the difference of his ends), and to be, with a pragmatistical view, a man suitable to the end of his existence.

The *powers of the spirit* * are those, whose exercise is possible by reason only. They are so far creative, as their use is not drawn from experience, but derived from principles *a priori*. Productions of those are the mathematics, logic and the metaphysic of nature, the two last of which are numbered with philosophy, namely, the theoretical, which then does not signify, according to the letter, a doctrine of wisdom, but only a science, but yet may promote the ends of the former.

The *powers of the soul* † are those, which are at the command of the understanding and of the rule, which it uses for the accomplishing of designs agreeable to it, and are so far led by the thread of experience. Such are memory, the imagination &c., upon which may be superstructed learning, erudition, taste (internal and external embellishment), which presents instruments for various purposes.

Finally the culture of the *powers of the body* (the proper gymnastics) is the care of that, which constitutes the *matter* in man, without which the ends of man would remain unexecuted: consequently the continual designed animation of the animal in man is a duty of man to himself.

20.

To consider which of these physical perfections *in preference*, and in what proportion, in comparison of one another, it is duty of man to make them his end, and with regard to the inclination to a certain

F 3

mode

* This denomination of the superior and inferior parts of the mind our author has perhaps taken from 1 Thess. v. 23, and Heb. iv. 12, which see.

mode of life and at the same time to the estimation of his powers thereto required to choose, for example, whether it shall be a trade, commerce, or a learned profession, are left to his own rational reflection. For, when abstraction is made from the necessity of self-preservation, which in itself can lay the foundation of no duty, it is a duty of man to himself to be a useful member of society, because this belongs to the value of the humanity in his own person, which he therefore ought not to debase.

The duty of man to himself, however, with respect to his *physical* perfection is, as it involves a law for the maxim of actions, but *large* and imperfect, but with respect to the actions themselves, according to their species and their degree, determines nothing, but allows a latitude to the free arbitrement.

SECTION THE SECOND

OF THE DUTY TO ONE'S SELF IN THE INCREASING
OF ONE'S MORAL PERFECTION, THAT IS,
MERELY WITH A MORAL VIEW.

21.

It consists *first*, subjectively, in the *purity* (*purity moralis*) of the mindedness of duty, where the law of itself only, without a mixture of views taken from the sensitive faculty, is the spring, and the actions are performed not merely in conformity to duty, but also *out of duty*. — *Be ye holy*, is here the commandment. *In the second place*, objectively, with regard to the whole moral end, which concerns *the* perfection, *id est*, one's whole duty and attaining the completion of the moral end in respect of one's self, *Be ye perfect*; to endeavour after which is with man never but a progression from *one* perfection to another,

another, 'if *there be* a virtue, and if *there be* any praise, think on these things.'

22.

This duty to one's self is according to the quality a *strict* and perfect one, though according to the degree but large and imperfect, and that on account of the *frailty* (*fragilitas*) of human nature.

That perfection, the active *endeavouring after* which, but not its *attainment* (in this life) is duty, whose observance can therefore consist but in the continual progression, is, with *regard* to the object (the idea, whose execution man ought to make his end), it is true, strict and perfect, but with *regard* to the subject, large and imperfect duty only to one's self.

The depths of the human heart are unfathomable. Who knows himself enough, when the spring of the observance of duty is felt by him, whether it arise from the representation of the law entirely, or whether many other sensible incentives, which aim at advantage (or obviating disadvantage) and on another occasion might be ready to serve vice too, do not co-operate. — But as to the perfection as moral end, there is indeed *in the idea* (objectively) but *one* virtue (as moral strength of the maxims) but in fact (subjectively) a multitude of virtues of heterogeneous quality, among which it is impossible not to find out some one want of virtue (though it does not, just on account of those, usually bear the name of vice) were it to be looked for. But a sum of virtues, whose completeness or wants never allow us to introspect sufficiently the self-cognition, can lay the foundation for no other than imperfect duty to be perfect.

All duties to one's self, then, with regard to the end of the humanity in our own person, are but imperfect ones.

ETHICAL ELEMENTAL DOCTRINE

PART THE SECOND

OF THE DUTIES OF VIRTUE TOWARDS OTHERS.

HEAD THE FIRST

OF THE DUTIES TOWARDS OTHERS, MERELY
AS MEN.

SECTION THE FIRST

OF THE DUTY OF LOVE TOWARDS OTHER MEN.

Division.

23.

THE chief division is that into duties towards others, so far as thou bindest them at the same time by the performance of the duties, and into those, whose observance has not the obligation of others as a consequence. — The former performance is (respectively to others) *meritorious*; that of the latter is *owed* duty. — *Love* and *reverence* are the feelings, which accompany the exercise of these duties. They may be considered apart and also subsist so. (*Love* of one's neighbour, though he may merit little *reverence*; in like manner necessary *reverence* for every man, though he were judged to be scarcely worthy of love). But they are at bottom according to the law always conjoined with one another in one duty; only so, that, sometimes the one duty, sometimes the other, to which the other is accessorially knit, consti-

constitutes the principle in the subject. — Thus we would acknowledge ourselves to be under an obligation to be beneficent towards a poor man; but, as this kindness comprises dependence of his weal upon my generosity, which however humbles him, it is duty to spare the receiver a humiliation by a behaviour, which represents this beneficence as either what is merely owed, or a small service of love, and to preserve for him his reverence for himself.

24.

When laws of duty (and not laws of nature), in the external relations of men towards one another, are the subject in hand, we contemplate ourselves in a moral (intelligible) world, in which, according to the analogy with the physical, the conjunction of rational beings (upon earth) is effectuated by *attraction* and *repulsion*. By means of the principle of *mutual love* they are directed to *approach* one another continually, by that of *reverence*, which they owe one another, to keep themselves at a *distance* from one another, and, should one of these great moral powers sink; 'then (to use *Haller's* words, but in another reference) would nothing (immorality) with a distended throat drink up the whole kingdom of (moral) beings, like a drop of water.'

25.

Love, however, is not here understood as a *feeling* (aesthetical), *id est*, as a pleasure in the perfection of other men, not as love of *complacency*, (for there can be no obligation by others to have feelings), but must be thought as a maxim of *benevolence* (as practical), which has beneficence as a consequence.

The very same must be said of the *reverence* to be shewn others, that not merely the *feeling* from the comparison of our own *worth* with that of others

is understood (such as a child feels for his parents, a scholar for his master, an inferior in general for his superiors from mere custom), but only a *maxim* of the limitation of our self-esteem, by the dignity of the humanity in another person, consequently the reverence in the practical sense (*observantia aliis praestanda*).

The duty of free reverence towards others, because it is but negative, (not to be haughty to others) and so analogous to the duty of law, not to detract from what belongs to any body, is though as a mere duty of virtue in a proportionate manner to the duty of love considered as *strict*, the latter therefore as *large* duty.

The duty of the love of the neighbour may be thus expressed, It is the duty to make mine the *ends* of others (so far as they are not immoral); the duty of reverence for my neighbour is comprehended in the maxim, To degrade no other person to a mean barely to my ends (not to require another to throw himself away, in order to serve my ends).

By exercising the former duty towards any one, I at the same time lay another under an obligation; I deserve well of him. By the observance of the latter, however, I oblige myself merely, limit myself, in order not to lessen the value, which he as a man is entitled to set upon himself.

Of the Duty of Love apart.

26.

PHILANTHROPY, because it is here conceived as practical, consequently not as love of the complacency in man, must be placed in active benevolence and for this reason concerns the maxim of the actions.

— Whoever takes pleasure in the wellbeing (*salus*) of men, so far as he contemplates them as such barely; who is *happy* when every other prospers, is named a *philanthropist* in general. He, who is but
happy

happy in the misfortunes of others, is a *misanthrope* (in the practical sense). Who is indifferent about what may befall others, if he is but happy himself, is a *solipsist* (*solipsista*). — But he, who, notwithstanding his *good will* to all men, flies from them, because he can find no *complacency* in them, may be named *unsociable* (an æsthetical misanthrope) and his shunning men anthropophobia.

27.

The maxim of benevolence (the practical philanthropy) is the duty of all men towards one another; whether they be found amiable or not, according to the ethical law of perfection, Love thy neighbour as thyself. — For all morally practical relation among men is a relation in the representation of pure reason, *id est*, of free actions according to maxims, which are qualified for universal legislation, and which cannot therefore be solipsistical (*ex solipsismo prodeuntes*). I will the benevolence of every other towards me; I ought then to be benevolent towards every other, But as all *others* save me are not *all*, consequently the maxim would not have the universality of a law in itself, which is however necessary to obligation; so the law of duty of benevolence comprises me too as its object in the commandment of practical reason; not as if I were thereby bound, to love myself (for this happens unavoidably without that, and there is no obligation thereto), but the legislative reason, (not man) which includes in its idea of humanity in general the whole species (therefore me therewith), as universally legislative comprehends me likewise in the duty of mutual benevolence according to the principle of equality, (all others on the same footing with me) and *allows* the to will well to thyself, on condition that thou willest well to every other; because in this manner only thy maxim (of beneficence) is

is qualified for an universal legislation, in which all law of duty is founded.

28.

The benevolence in the universal philanthropy is indeed as to the *compass* the greatest, but as to the *degree* the smallest, and, when I say that I take part in the weal of this man but according to the universal philanthropy, the interest, which I here take, is the smallest possible. I am with regard to him but not indifferent.

But the one is more intimately connected with me than the other, and in point of benevolence I am the most intimately connected with myself. How does that accord with the formule, Love thy *neighbour* (thy fellow-man) as thyself? When one is in a nearer relation so me (in the duty of benevolence) than another, and I therefore bound to a greater benevolence towards the one, than towards the other, but I am avowedly in a nearer relation to myself (even as to duty), than to every other, thus, as it seems, I cannot say, without contradicting myself, that I ought to love every man as myself; for the scale of self-love would allow of no difference in degrees. — It is quickly seen that here is not meant the benevolence of the *wish* merely, which is properly a mere complacency in the weal of every other, even without needing to contribute any thing thereto (every one for himself, and God for us all), but an active practical benevolence, to make the weal and prosperity of others one's *end* (beneficence). For in wishing I can will well to all *equally*, but in doing the degree, according to the difference of the beloved (of whom the one may be more intimately connected with me than the other), may, without violating the universality of the maxim, be very different.

DIVISION

DIVISION OF THE DUTIES OF LOVE.

They are, A, Duties of Beneficence, B, of Gratitude,
C, of active Sympathy.

A.

Of the Duty of Beneficence.

29.

To take one's ease, as far as it is necessary, in order to find but a pleasure in life, (yet not to pamper one's body to effeminacy) pertains to the duties towards one's self; — whose contrary is, Out of (slavish) *avarice* to deprive one's self either of what is necessary to the cheerful enjoyment of life, or from exaggerated *discipline* of one's natural inclinations, enthusiastically to rob one's self of the enjoyment of the pleasures of life, both which are repugnant to the duty of man towards himself.

But how can one, besides the *benevolence* of the wish with regard to other men (which costs us nothing), still require this to be practical, *id est*, require *beneficence* towards the necessitous of every one, who has the faculty thereto, as duty? — Benevolence is pleasure in the happiness (wellbeing) of others, but beneficence the maxim to make it one's end, and duty thereto is the necessitation of the subject by reason to adopt this maxim as an universal law.

It is not obvious of itself that such a law in general lies in reason; but rather the maxim, 'Every one for himself, and God (fate) for us all,' seems to be the most natural.

30.

To be beneficent, *id est*, to promote according to one's ability the happiness of other men in want, without expecting any thing in return, is every man's duty.

For

For every one, who is in want, wishes to be assisted by other men. Should he however divulge his maxim, not to be willing in his turn to assist others in want, that is, ordain it a universal permissive law; every body would likewise refuse him, when he himself is in want, their assistance, or at least be entitled to refuse it. The selfish maxim therefore collides against itself, when it is made a universal law, *id est*, it is contrary to duty, consequently the maxim of public utility, that of beneficence towards those in want, is universal duty of men and that because they are to be considered as fellow-men, that is, indigent rational beings united by nature upon one place of abode for the purpose of mutual assistance.

31.

Beneficence, for him, who is *rich* (furnished superfluously, that is, beyond his own wants, with the *means* of the happiness of others) is almost not to be holden by the benefactor even this meritorious duty; though he at the same time thereby binds the others. The pleasure, which he hereby occasions himself and which costs him no sacrifice, is a mode of rioting in moral feelings. — He must also carefully avoid every appearance as if he thought by this to bind the other; because it would not else be a real benefaction, which he conferred on him, by discovering that he intended to impose an obligation on him (which always humbles him in his own eyes). He must rather appear as if he himself were either obliged, or even honoured, by the other's acceptance consequently as if the duty were what he merely owed (*actio debita*), if he does not (which is better) exercise his act of beneficence quite in secret. — The virtue is greater, when the ability of doing good is limited, and the benefactor strong enough to take silently upon himself the evil, from which he delivers others,
in

in which case he is to be considered as in reality morally *rich*.

Casuistical Questions.

How far ought one to spend his property in doing good? Certainly not to such a degree, as to stand in need himself of the beneficence of others. What is the value of the benefaction, which one confers with a cold hand (in bidding farewell to the world by a testament)? Can he, who exercises a supreme authority, which is allowed him by the law of the land, over a person, whom he deprives of the *liberty* of being happy according to his own choice (his subject who inherits an estate), can he, I say, consider himself as a benefactor, when he, according to *his* own conceptions of happiness, provides for him, as it were, in a paternal manner? Or is not rather the injustice, to rob one of his liberty, something so repugnant to the duty of law, that, counting upon the beneficence of the ruler, to yield up one's self on this condition, would be the greatest throwing away of the humanity in him, who resolved on it voluntarily, and the greatest care the ruler could take of him, would be no beneficence at all. Or can the merit of this be so great, as to be put into the balance with the rights of mankind? — I can do good to nobody according to *my* conceptions of felicity (except to persons, either under age, or insane), but according to the conceptions of *him*, on whom, by obtruding on him a present, I think to confer a benefaction.

The faculty of doing good, which depends upon the goods of fortune, is for the most part a consequence of the favouring of several men by the injustice of the government, which introduces an inequality of fortune that renders necessary others' beneficence. Under such circumstances, Does the relief, which the rich may afford those who are in want, in general deserve

deserve the name of beneficence, which one is so willingly proud of as a merit?

B.

Of the Duty of Gratitude.

GRATITUDE is the *honouring* of a person on account of a benefaction or a favour conferred on us. The feeling, which is conjoined with this judgment, is that of reverence for the benefactor (who lays him under an obligation), whereas the benefactor is considered but as in the relation of love towards the receiver. — Even a mere cordial *benevolence* of another, without physical consequences, merits the name of a duty of virtue; which grounds the distinction between the *active* and the merely *affectionate* gratitude.

32.

Gratitude is duty, *id est*, not merely a *maxim of prudence*, by testifying my obligation for the beneficence shown me, to induce the other to further good offices (*gratiarum actia est ad plus dandum invitatio*); for I thereby make use of this as a mean barely to my other views; but it is immediate necessitation by the moral law, *id est*, duty.

Gratitude, however, must also be particularly considered as *sacred* duty, that is, as such a one, whose violation can annihilate even in the principle the moral spring of doing good (as a scandalous example). For that moral object is sacred, in regard of which the obligation cannot be fully cancelled by any act conformable to it (whereby the obliged always remains obliged). All other gratitude is *common* duty. — A received benefaction cannot be *requited* beyond it by any retaliation, because the receiver never can gain from the donor the preference of the merit, which he has in having been the first to shew good

good will. — But, even without such an act (of benefaction) the mere cordial good will is a sufficient ground of obligation to gratitude. — A grateful mindedness of this sort is named *acknowledgment* or *thankfulness*.

33.

As to the *extension* of this gratitude, it refers not only to contemporaries, but to predecessors, even to those, who cannot be named with certainty. That is the reason why it is holden to be unbecoming not to defend the ancients, who may be considered as our masters, as much as possible against all attacks, accusations, and slighting; but it is a silly conceit to fancy in them, on account of antiquity, a preference to the moderns in talents and in good will, as if the world were in a state of continual decay of its original perfection according to laws of nature, and to despise every thing new in comparison of those.

But as to the *intension*, that is, the degree of the obligation to this duty, it is to be estimated according to the advantage, which the obliged has derived from the benefaction, and the disinterestedness, with which this was conferred on him. The smallest degree is to do *equal* services to the benefactor, who is receptive of these (*id est*, still alive) and, when he is not, to others: not to consider a benefaction received as a burden, which one would be willingly relieved of, (because he, who is so favoured, stands a step lower than his benefactor, and this mortifies his pride): but to receive even the cause of it as a moral benefaction, that is, as an occasion given to exercise this virtue of philanthropy, which with the *sincerity* of the benevolent mindedness combines at the same time *tenderness* of benevolence (attention to the smallest degree of that mindedness in the representation of duty), and so to cultivate philanthropy.

C.

Sympathetic Sensation is in general Duty.

34.

TAKING a part in another's joy or sorrow, or *sympathy of joy* and *sympathy of sorrow* (*sympathia moralis*) are indeed sensible feelings of either a pleasure or a displeasure (which for that reason may be termed æsthetical) in the state of pleasure as well as of pain of others (fellow-feeling, sympathetic sensation), of which nature has laid the receptibility in man. But to use these as means of promoting the active and rational benevolence, is still a peculiar, though but a conditional, duty, under the name of *humanity*; because man is here contemplated not only as a rational being, but as an animal endowed with reason. This may now be placed in the *faculty* and in the *will*, either to *communicate* one's feelings to one another (*humanitas practica*), or merely in the *receptibility* of the common or joint feeling of pleasure or of pain (*humanitas æsthetica*), which nature itself gives. The former is *free* and is hence named *taking a part in* (*communio sentiendi liberalis*) and is founded in practical reason; the latter is *not free* (*communio sentiendi illiberalis, servilis*) and may be denominated *communicating* (like that of heat or of contagious diseases) and also compassion; where it naturally diffuses itself among men living together. Only to the former is there an obligation.

It was a sublime mode of representation of the *sage*, as the stoic conceived him, when he made him speak thus, I wish to have a friend, not to afford *me* assistance in poverty, in disease, in captivity &c., but in order that I may protect *him* and save a man; and yet says the very same sage to himself, when his friend is not to be saved, What's that to me? that is, he rejected compassion.

In

In fact, when another suffers and I allow myself (by means of the imagination) to be, as it were, infected by his pain, but which I cannot relieve, thus both suffer; though the evil properly (in nature) affects but one. It however cannot possibly be duty to increase the evil in the world, consequently not to do good *out of sympathy of sorrow*; as this would be an injurious manner of doing good, by expressing benevolence, which refers to the unworthy and is named *mercy*, among men, who need not just boast of their worthiness to be happy, and respectively to one another ought not at all to occur.

But to have sympathy of sorrow (and also sympathy of joy) with others, is not in itself duty, yet it is an active taking part in their fate, and to that end indirect duty to cultivate in us the commiserating natural (æsthetical) feelings, and to use them as so many means to sympathy from moral principles and the feeling conformable to them. — Thus is it duty, not to avoid the places, where the poor, who are in want of the most common necessities of life, are to be found, but to seek them out, and not to fly from the apartments of the sick, or the prison of the debtor &c., in order to evitate the painful fellow-feeling, from which we cannot defend ourselves; because that is one of the incentives inherent in our nature to do what the representation of duty of itself only would not accomplish.

Casuistical Questions.

WOULD it not be better for the world in general if all the morality of men were limited to the duties of law only, yet with the greatest conscientiousness, but benevolence numbered with the adiaphories? It is not so easy to be discovered of what consequence it might be to the felicity mankind. But in this case

there would be wanting at least a great moral ornament of the world, philanthropy, which of itself even without reckoning the advantages (of felicity), is required to represent the world as a beautiful moral whole in its full perfection.

Gratitude is not properly a return of love from the obliged towards the benefactor, but *reverence* for him. For to the universal love of one's neighbour must be laid as a foundation an equality of duties; in gratitude however the obliged stands a step lower than his benefactor. Is not that the cause of so much ingratitude, namely, pride, to see a person above one's self; ill-will, not being able to put one's self on a perfect equality (as to the relations of duty) with him?

Of the Vices of Misanthropy directly (contrarie) opposed to Philanthropy.

36.

THEY make up the detestable family of *envy*, of *ingratitude*, and of *joy at another's misfortune*. — The hatred here, however, is not open and violent, but secret and veiled, which to the neglect of duty towards one's neighbour superadds baseness, and thus violates at the same time the duty to one's self.

a. *Envy (livor)*, which, as a propension to perceive with pain the prosperity of others, though one's own thereby suffers no damage; when it breaks out into the act (to lessen another's prosperity) is named, *qualified envy*, but else *invidiousness (invidentia)* only, is however but an indirect malignant mindedness, namely, indignation, to see our own prosperity eclipsed by that of others, because we know to place the measure of it, not in their internal value, but only in comparison of the prosperity of others, and to render sensible this estimation. — Hence an *enviable* concord and happiness in either a marriage

marriage or a family &c., is also spoken of; as if it were allowed in some cases to envy any body. The emotions of envy, therefore, lie in the nature of man and their eruption only makes them the abominable vice of a peevish passion, tormenting one's self and directed to the destruction of the fortune of others, at least as to the wish, by consequence is repugnant to the duty of man towards himself, as well as towards others.

b. Ingratitude to one's benefactor, which, when it is carried so far as to hate him, is named *qualified ingratitude*, but otherwise *want of acknowledgment* merely or unthankfulness, is a vice detested in the judgment of the public; and the man so defamed on account of it, that it is not considered improbable but one might even make an enemy to himself by means of favours granted. — The ground of the possibility of such a vice, lies in the duty towards one's self misunderstood, not to stand in need of nor to ask the beneficence of others, because it lays us under an obligation to them, but rather to support the troubles of life ourselves, than to burden others with them, consequently to become indebted (obliged) to them; because we are thereby afraid to descend to the low step of the situation of the protected with his protector; which is incompatible with the genuine self-estimation (to be proud of the dignity of the humanity in one's own person). Gratitude therefore to those, who must *inevitably* precede us in doing good (to the memory of predecessors, or to parents) is shown liberally, but that to contemporaries but sparingly, nay, in order to render this relation of inequality invisible, even the contrary of it is shown. — But this is then a vice revolting to humanity, not merely on account of the *hurt*, which such an example must occasion men in general by deterring from farther beneficence, (for these, with genuine moral mindedness, may put, even in the disdain of

all such reward, but a greater intrinsic moral value in their doing good); but because philanthropy here, as it were, inverted, is dishonoured, and the want of love in the very moral faculty to hate those who love.

c. The *joy at another's misfortune*, which is directly the converse of sympathy, is not foreign to human nature; though, when it goes so far as even to assist in effecting the evil or bad, it as *qualified joy at another's misfortune* renders misanthropy visible and appears in all its hideousness. To feel one's wellbeing or even one's good conduct stronger, when the misfortune, or the disgrace of another, is laid like a foil under our own prosperity to give it a greater lustre, is indeed according to laws of the imagination, namely, of contrast, founded in nature. But to rejoice immediately at the existence of such *enormities* destroying the universal good of the world, consequently to wish for the like events, is a secret misanthropy and the direct contrary of the love of one's neighbour, which is incumbent on us as duty. — The *superciliousness* to others in uninterrupted prosperity and the *arrogance* in good conduct, (properly, however, but in the good fortune to have escaped the seducement to public vice), both which the self-loving man makes a merit of to himself, produce the inimical joys, which, according to the principle of sympathy (of the honest Cremes in Terence) 'I am a man; whatever befalls men affects me too,' is directly opposed to duty.

Desire of revenge is the sweetest of the joys at another's misfortune, and over and above with the appearance of the greatest right, nay, obligation (as desire of law), to make, even without proper advantage, the misfortune of others one's end.

Every act contrary to the right of a man merits punishment; whereby the crime is *avenged* on the delinquent (not merely the damage occasioned repaired).

paired). But punishment is not an act of the private authority of the offended, but of a court different from him, which gives effect to the laws of a *superior* over all, who are subjected to him, and, when we contemplate men (as it is necessary in ethics) in a juridical state, but *according to mere laws of reason* (not according to civil ones), nobody has the moral faculty to inflict punishment and to revenge an offence received from men, but he who is the chief moral Legislator, and he only (God) can say, *Vengeance is mine: I will repay*. It is therefore duty of virtue not only not to requite with hatred, merely out of revenge, the enmity of others, but not even to call down vengeance from the Judge of the world; partly because man has proper guilt enough, to stand in great need of pardon, partly, and indeed principally, because no punishment, from whomsoever it may be, can be inflicted out of hatred. — Hence *placability* is a duty of man; wherewith the *mild endurance of injuries* (*mitis injuriarum patientia*), however, as the giving up of rigid (*rigorosa*) means, in order to prevent the continual outrages of others, must not be permuted; for that would be throwing one's rights under the feet of others and a violation of the duty of man to himself.

Annotation. All vices, which would even render human nature hateful, if they (as qualified) were taken in the sense of principles, are *inhuman* objectively contemplated, but yet *human* subjectively pondered, *id est*, as experience teaches us to know our species. Though some of the vices may indeed, in the ardour of detestation, be named *diabolical*, and their companion (*pendant*) *angelic virtue*; both conceptions are but ideas of a *maximum*, conceived as a scale in behalf of the comparison of the degree of morality, by showing man his place in either *heaven* or *hell*, without making a middle being of him, which occupies neither the one nor the other of these places.

Whether Haller, with his 'ambiguous medium of angels and of brutes,' has hit it better, may remain here undecided. But the dividing in a combination of heterogeneous things leads to no determinate conception at all, and to this nothing can direct us in the order of beings unknown to us as to their difference of classes. The former parallel (drawn between angelic virtue and diabolical vice) is exaggeration. The latter, though men, alas! fall into *brutal* vices also, does not justify attributing to those a predisposition to these *belonging to their species*, more than the disease of a few trees in a forest is a reason for making a particular *sort* of vegetable of them.

SECTION THE SECOND.

OF THE DUTIES OF VIRTUE TOWARDS OTHER
MEN FROM THE REVERENCE DUE TO THEM.

37.

MODERATION in pretensions in general, *id est*, voluntary limitation of the self-love of a man by the self-love of others, is named *modesty*. The want of *this moderation* (immodesty) in regard to the worthiness of being *loved* by others, *philauty*. But the immodesty of the demand, to be *reverenced* by others, is *self-conceit* or *arrogance*. *Reverence*, which I bear others, or which another may require of me (*observantia aliis praestanda*), is the agnizing of a *dignity* in other men, *id est*, an inestimable value that has no æquivalent, for which the object of esteem could be exchanged. — The judgment of a thing, as that which is of no value, is contempt.

38.

Every man has a just claim to reverence from his
neighbours

neighbours and is *on his part* bound to have it for every other.

Humanity itself is a dignity; for man cannot be used as a bare mean by any man (neither by others nor even by himself), but must always be considered as an end at the same time, and just therein consists his dignity (the personality), whereby he is elevated above all other beings of the world, which are not men, and for that reason may be used, by consequence he is elevated above all things. As he cannot give himself away for any price (which else would be discordant with the duty of self-estimation), so he cannot act in contradiction to the just as necessary self-estimation of others, *id est*, he is bound to acknowledge practically the dignity of the humanity in every other person, consequently a duty that refers to the reverence necessary to be shewn to every other man, is incumbent on him.

39.

To *contemn* others, *id est*, to refuse them the reverence due to men in general, is in all cases contrary to duty; for they are men. Internally to *despise* them in comparison of others is indeed sometimes unavoidable, but the external testimony of despising is an injury. — What is *dangerous*, is not an object of contempt, of course the vicious too is not; and, when the reflection on his attacks justifies me in saying that I contemn him, it signifies but as much, as that there is no danger, though I should prepare no defence at all against him, because he exhibits himself in his reprobateness. I cannot the less on that account deny even the vicious as a man all reverence, of which he, at least in the quality of a man, cannot be deprived; though he, it is true, has by his act rendered himself unworthy of it. So there may be disgraceful punishments, dishonourable to humanity itself, (such as quartering, being torn to pieces by dogs, cutting off ears and noses) which are

not more painful to the lover of honour only (who lays claim to the reverence of others, which every one must do), than the loss of goods and of life, but make the spectator blush to belong to a species, which may be thus treated.

Annotation. In this is founded the duty of reverence for man, even in the logical use of his reason; not to mention the faults of reason under the name of absurdity, of insipid judgment &c., but rather to presuppose that something must be true in that use, and to investigate this; but thereby to discover at the same time the illusive appearance (the subjective of the determinatives of the judgment, which by an oversight is held objective), and so, by explaining the possibility of erring, still preserve for him the reverence for his understanding. For, if one refuses by those expressions all understanding to his adversary in a certain judgment, How will one then give him to understand that he has erred? — In the same manner is circumstantiated the reproach of vice, which must never extend to total contempt and the refusal of all moral worth of the vicious; because he, according to this hypothesis, can never be made better; which is incompatible with the idea of a *man* who, as such, (a moral being), never can sustain the loss of all predisposition to the good.

40.

The reverence for the law, which is shown subjectively as a moral feeling, is the same with the consciousness of one's duty. For which reason the showing of reverence for man as a moral being (highly esteeming his duty) is even a duty, which others owe to him, and a right, to which he cannot relinquish the claim. — This claim is distinguished by the appellation of *love of honour*, whose phenomenon in the external conduct is named *becomingness* (*bonestas externa*), but the fault committed against it

it *scandal*: an example of the want of reverence for it, which might occasion imitation; *to give* which example, is indeed highly contrary to duty, but to take one in that which is merely paradoxical, otherwise good in itself, a fancy (when what is not customary is also held illicit), a fault dangerous and destructive to virtue. — For the reverence due to other men who give an example, cannot degenerate to blind imitation (when custom, *mos*, is elevated to the dignity of a law); as such a tyranny of popular custom would be repugnant to the duty of man towards himself.

4I.

Omission of the mere duties of love, is *want of virtue* (*peccatum*). But omission of the duty, which springs from the *reverence* due to every man in general, is *vice* (*vitium*). For by the neglect of the former nobody is injured; by the omission of the latter, however, man suffers an injury in regard of his legal pretensions. — The latter transgression is the contrary-to-duty of the *contrary* (*contrarie oppositum virtutis*). But that, which is not only no moral increment, but even destroys the value of what would otherwise be productive of good to the subject, is *vice*.

On that account the duties towards one's neighbour from the reverence due to him are but negatively expressed, *id est*, this duty of virtue is but indirectly expressed (by the prohibition of the contrary).

Of the Vices, which violate the Duty of Reverence for other Men.

These vices are A Loftiness, B Obtrectation, and C Derision.

A. Lofti-

A.

Loftiness.

42.

LOFTINESS (*superbia* and, as this word and the German one *Hochmuth* express, the inclination always to be the *uppermost*), is a species of *ambition*, according to which we require other men to despise themselves in comparison of us, and therefore a vice repugnant to the reverence, which every man may legally claim.

Loftiness or highmindedness is distinguished from *pride* (*animus elatus*), as *love of honour*, *id est*, care to diminish nothing of one's dignity as a man in comparison of others, (which has, on that account, the adjective *noble* usually affixed to it); for Loftiness desires from others a reverence, which it refuses them. — But this pride itself, though it is merely a demand on others to occupy themselves about its importance, becomes a fault and an offence.

It is perfectly obvious that highmindedness, which is, as it were, the ambitious making interest for followers, and believes himself entitled to treat them contemptuously, is *unjust* and dissonant from the reverence due to men in general; that it is *folly* too, *id est*, vanity in the use of the means to something, which in a certain relation is not at all worthy of being an end, nay, even *coxcombry*, that is, an offensive want of understanding to make use of such means, as must produce on others the direct contrary of one's end, (for every body refuses reverence to the highminded the more, the more he aspires to it). — All that is obvious. It may have been less noticed, however, that the highminded is always *abject* in the bottom of his soul. For he would not require of others to hold themselves insignificant in comparison of him, did he not find by himself that, should

should a reverse of fortune happen to him, he would by no means find it hard to cringe or to behave with servility in his turn and to relinquish all claim to reverence from others.

E.

Of Obtrectation.

43.

OBTRECTATION or detraction, by which I do not mean *calumny* (*contumelia*), a false obtrectation, for which one may be prosecuted, but merely the immediate inclination, without any particular view, to spread abroad something derogatory from the reverence due to humanity in general; because all scandal given weakens this reverence, upon which rests every incitement to the moral good, and occasions it, as much as possible, to be disbelieved.

The assiduous *propagation* (*propalatio*) of what is lessening to the honour of another, and which does not pertain to public jurisdiction, is, even were it true, a diminution of the reverence for humanity in general, in order finally to cast the shade of naughtiness upon our species itself, and either to render misanthropy (*anthropophobia*), or contempt of man the prevailing cast of mind, or by the frequent sight of it to obtund one's moral feeling and to accustom one's self thereto. It is therefore a duty of virtue, instead of the malicious pleasure in discovering the faults of others, in order thereby to secure one's self in the opinion of being good, at least not worse than all other men, to throw the veil of philanthropy over the faults of others, not merely by the mitigation of our judgments, but by concealing them; because examples of reverence, which others give us, may excite the active endeavour to merit them equally. — Wherefore the watching of the actions

actions and morals of others (*allogrio-episcopa*) is of itself an offensive curiosity of the art of scrutinizing the character of man, which every one may, as a violation of the reverence due to him, justly oppose.

C.

Derision.

44.

INCONSIDERATE censoriousness and the propensity to turn others into ridicule, and mockery, in order to make another's faults the immediate object of one's merriment, are wickedness, and totally distinct from the joke (*plaisanterie*), the familiarity among friends, to laugh at their faults but as seeming one's, but in fact as excellencies of spirit, not to be always confined to the rules of fashion, (which is then no *laughter in scorn*). But to expose to ridicule real faults, or, as if they were real, feigned one's, which aim at robbing the person of his merited reverence, and the propensity to that ridicule, the rage for *bitter* mockery, (*spiritus causticus*) has something of diabolical joy in it and is on that account a greater violation of the duty of reverence for other men.

Different from this, however, is the jocular, though bantering retort of the insulting attacks of an adversary (*retortio jocosa*), whereby the mocker (or in general a malicious but feeble adversary) is equally made the subject of mockery, a just defence of the reverence, which the insulted may require of him. But when the object is properly no object of wit, but such an one, in which reason of necessity takes a moral interest, it is, let the adversary have scoffed ever so much, and at the same time have laid himself open ever so much to derision, more suitable to the dignity of the object and the reverence for humanity, to oppose to the attack either no defence at all, or one made with both dignity and seriousness.

Annota-

Annotation. It may be perceived that under the foregoing title virtues have not been so much praised, as their opposite vices blamed; that lies however in the conception of reverence, in the manner we are bound to show it to other men, which is but a *negative* duty. — I am not obliged to *honour* others (contemplated as men merely), *id est*, to show them *positive* esteem. All the reverence, to which I am bound by nature, is that for the law in general (*reverere legem*) and this, but neither to honour other men in general (*reverentia adversus hominem*), nor in this to perform any thing to them, is an universal and unconditional duty of man towards others, which, as the original reverence due to them (*observantia debita*), may be required of every one.

The various modes of showing reverence according to the difference of either the quality of men, or their casual relations, namely, that of age, of sex, of descent, of strength or of weakness, or even the distinction of rank and dignity, which in part rests upon dispositions at pleasure, need not be exhibited and classified at large in *metaphysical* elements of ethics, as only the pure principles of reason of those are here the object.

HEAD THE SECOND.

OF THE ETHICAL DUTIES OF MEN TOWARDS ONE ANOTHER IN REGARD TO THEIR STATE.

45.

THESE (duties of virtue) cannot give occasion in pure ethics to a particular head in their system; for they do not contain principles of the obligation of men as such to one another, and therefore cannot properly form a *part* of the *metaphysical* elements of ethics,

ethics, but are rules only modified according to the difference of the subjects and of the *application* of the principle of virtue (according to the formal) to cases occurring in experience (the material), on which account they, like all empirical divisions, allow no sure complete classification. As a transition, however, which has its particular rules, is required from the metaphysic of nature to physics; so is in all justice required a similar one of the metaphysic of morals, namely, by application of pure principles of duty to cases of experience, as it were, to *schematise* and to exhibit that ready for the morally practical use. — What behaviour, then, is suitable to men, for instance, in the moral purity of their state, or in their corruption; what in the cultivated, or in the rude, state; what to the learned or to the illiterate, and to those in the use of their science as conversable (polished, that is, of elegant manners), or in their province in conversable (pedants), pragmatical, or aiming more at spirit and taste; what, according to the distinction of rank, the difference of age, of sex, of the state of health, that of opulence, or of poverty &c., which does not make so many *species* of ethical *obligation*, (for there is but *one*, that of virtue in general) but only modes of *application* (porismas); which cannot therefore be made as sections of ethics and members of the *division* of a system (which must arise from a conception of reason *à priori*), but only annexed. — This application, however, belongs to the completeness of the exhibition of the system.

CONCLUSION

CONCLUSION OF THE ELEMENTAL DOCTRINE.

*Of the most intimate Union of Love with Reverence
in Friendship.*

46.

FRIENDSHIP (contemplated in its perfection) is the union of two persons by equal mutual love and reverence. — It is obvious that it is an ideal of the taking part and communication of the welfare of each of them united by the morally good will and, if it should not effectuate the whole felicity of life, yet its adoption in the mindedness of both comprises the worthiness of being happy, consequently that friendship between men is their duty. — That friendship, however, a mere (but yet practically necessary) idea, in the execution indeed unattainable, but yet prescribed by reason to endeavour after it (as a *maximum* of the good mindedness towards one another), is not a common, but an honourable duty, is easily perceived. For, How is it possible for man, in relation to his neighbour, to find out the *equality* of one of the parts requisite to this duty (for example, of mutual benevolence) in the one, with the very same mindedness in the other? and still more, What relation has in the same person the feeling from the one duty to that from the other (for instance, that from benevolence, to that from reverence), and whether, when the one is more tender in *love*, he do not just thereby lose something of the *reverence* of the other, so that love and high esteem will hardly be brought subjectively to an equal balance; to do which is however requisite to friendship? For that may be considered as attraction, this as repulsion, and it may be assumed that, when the principle of the former commands approachment, that of the latter requires the holding of one another at a becoming distance, which limitation of familiarity expressed by

this rule, That even the best friends ought to avoid *making too free* with one another, comprehends a maxim, which is not useful to superiors only with regard to inferiours, but also *vice versa*. For the superior feels, before one is aware of it, his pride mortified, and desires to suspend, perhaps for a moment, but not annul, the reverence for the inferiour, but which, once violated, is internally, though the external mark of it (the ceremony) is brought back to the old course, irretrievably lost.

Friendship in its purity, or completeness, conceived as attainable (between Orestes and Pylades, Theseus and Pyriithous), is the hobbyhorse of novel-writers; whereas Aristotle says, My dear friends, there is no such person as a friend! The following annotations may serve to bend the attention to its difficulties.

Morally pondered, it is the duty of one friend to point out to another his faults; for it is done with a view to his welfare and is therefore a duty of love. But his other half sees in this a want of the reverence, which he expected from him, and that he either has lost, or, as he is observed and secretly criticised by his friend, runs a constant risk of losing his reverence; as then, that he must be observed and mastered, will seem to him to be offensive in themselves.

How desirable is a friend in need (provided he be an active and helpful one with a sufficient fortune)! But yet it is a great burden to feel one's self chained to another's fate and loaded with another person's wants. — Friendship therefore cannot be a conjunction aiming at reciprocal advantage, but must be purely moral, and the assistance, which the one may count upon from the other in a case of need, must not be meant as the end and the determinative to it, — the one would thereby lose the reverence of the other, — but can be so as an external mark only of internal

internal benevolence cordially meant, without allowing it, however, to come to the trial, which is always dangerous, every one generously endeavouring to lighten the other of this burden, to bear it himself only, nay, to hide it from him entirely, but may always flatter himself that, in case of need, he could certainly count upon the assistance of the other. But when the one receives a *favour* from the other, he may perhaps reckon upon equality in love, but not in reverence, for he is evidently a step lower, to be under an obligation and not to be able to oblige in his turn. — Friendship, notwithstanding the delightful sensation of the mutual possession approaching towards melting together into one person, is at the same time something so *tender* (*teneritas amicitiae*), that, when it is allowed to rest upon feeling, and this mutual communication and attachment is not built upon principles nor the rules which guard against too great familiarity and limit the mutual love by demands of reverence, it is not an instant secure from *interruptions*; such are common among uncultivated persons, though they on that account do not always occasion *separation* (for the populace box and become friends again); they can neither let one another alone, nor be unanimous, because wrangling is their element and necessary to them, in order to taste the sweets of concord in the reconciliation. — But whatever happens the love in friendship cannot be an *affect*; as this is blind in the choice and in the continuance evaporating.

47.

Moral friendship (in distinction from the æsthetical) is the full confidence of two persons in the mutual disclosing of their secret judgments and feeling, so far as it can consist with the reverence for one another on both sides.

Man is a being destined to society (though un-

sociable also) and in the culture of the social state powerfully feels the necessity of *unbosoming* himself to others (even without having thereby any thing in view); but, on the other side, confined and warned by the fear of the bad use, which others might make of this imparting of his thoughts, finds himself obliged to *lock up* in himself a great part of his judgments (especially on other men). He would willingly discourse with any person on his opinions concerning those, with whom he has intercourse, or what he thinks of the government, religion &c.; but dares not venture, partly because the other, who carefully reserves his own judgment, would make use of his opinions to his hurt, partly, as to the disclosing of one's own faults, because the other would conceal his, and in this manner he would, if he displayed himself quite openly before him, sustain the loss of his reverence.

Should he however be fortunate enough to find one, with whom, in regard of that danger, he needs not be under the smallest apprehension, but to whom he can unbosom himself with perfect confidence, who over and above has a mode of judging of things that harmonises with his own, he may give a loose to his thoughts; he is not totally *alone* with his thoughts, as in a prison, and enjoys a liberty, of which he is deprived in the great crowd, where he must shut himself up in himself. Every man has secrets and dares not have a blind confidence in others; partly on account of the dishonourable cast of mind of most, to make a use of them prejudicial to him, and partly because of the want of understanding in many in the judgment and distinction of that which may be repeated, or not (indiscretion), which properties are seldom to be met with in the same subject (*rara avis in terris, et nigro simillima cygno*); especially as the strictest friendship requires that this intelligent bosom-friend shall at the same time be bound to keep this

secret

secret confided to him, inviolably, and not to communicate it to another, without the express permission of his friend.

This (merely moral friendship) is no ideal, but (the black swan) actually exists here and there in its perfection; but that (pragmatical one) burdening itself with the ends of other men, though out of love, can have neither the purity, nor the necessary completeness, which is requisite to a maxim that must be precisely determined, and is an ideal of the wish, which in conceptions of reason knows no bounds, but in experience must always be very bounded. A *philanthropist* in general, however, (*id est*, of the whole species) is he, who takes an æsthetical part in the weal of all men [sympathy of joy], and will never disturb it without internal regret. But the expression of a *friend* of man is of a somewhat stricter signification still, than that of the *philanthropist* merely. For in that is comprised the representation and consideration of the *equality* among men, consequently the idea to be thereby even obliged, because one lays an obligation on others by beneficence; so to speak, like brothers under a common father, who willeth the felicity of them all. — For the relation of the protector, as benefactor, to the protected, as obliged in gratitude is a relation of mutual love, it is true, but not of friendship, because the reverence of both due to one another is not equal. The duty to will well to men as a friend (a necessary condescension) and the taking of it to heart, serve to guard against the pride, which is wont to seize the happy, who possess the faculty of doing good.

SUPPLEMENT

Of the Virtues of the social Intercourse
(Virtutes homileticae.)

48.

It is duty, as well towards one's self, as towards others, to exchange with one another one's moral-perfections (*officium commercii, sociabilitas*); not to isolate or seclude one's self (*separatistam agere*); to make for one's self an immoveable centre of one's principles, but yet to consider this circle described around him as one that makes a part of a circle, which encompasses all, the cosmopolitical mindedness; not just in order to forward the welfare of the world as the end, but only the mutual active sympathy, which indirectly leads thereto, to cultivate the *agremens* in it, the sociableness, the mutual love and reverence (humanity and becomingness, *humanitas aesthetica, et decorum*), and thus to associate the graces with virtue; to put which in execution is even duty of virtue.

These are but outworks, or by-works (*parerga*), that give a beautiful appearance similar to virtue, but which does not deceive, because every body knows how he must take it. It is indeed but small money, but yet promotes the feeling of virtue, even by the endeavour to bring this appearance as near as possible to truth, in *accessibleness, affability, politeness, hospitality, gentleness* (in contradicting, without quarrelling), all bare modes of the exchange of manifested obligations, whereby one obliges others at the same time, and which, at least by *endearing* virtue, contribute therefore to the mindedness of virtue.

The question however is, Whether the intercourse with vicious men be admissible? Their society cannot be

be avoided; else one would need to go out of the world; and besides, our judgment on them is not competent. — But when the vice becomes a scandal, *id est*, a public example given of the contempt of the strict laws of duty, consequently carries dishonour with it, even though the law of the land does not punish it, the intercourse, which till then subsisted, must be either broken off, or as much as possible avoided; because the longer continuance of it disgraces virtue and exposes it to sale to every one, who is rich enough to bribe the parasite with the pleasures of luxury.

is avoided; else one would need to go out of the
world and be left in a state of isolation. — But when the vice becomes a habit,
it is, a habit which is given or laid down by nature
since laws of duty, consequently, cannot be known
with it, even though the law of the land does not
pursue it. The interest which is then substituted
must be either broken off or as much as possible
avoided: because the interest in duty is a habit
which and cannot be broken off by any one, who is
then enough to bring the parties with the pleasure
of duty.

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ETHICS

PART THE SECOND.

ETHICAL DOCTRINAL METHOD.

SECTION THE FIRST.

THE ETHICAL DIDACTIC.

49.

THAT virtue must be acquired (that it is not innate) lies in its conception, without our having occasion on that account to refer to anthropological knowledge from experience. For the moral faculty of man, if it were not produced by the *strength* of the resolution in the conflict with so powerful opposite inclinations, would not be virtue. It is the production of the pure practical reason, so far as this reason in the consciousness of its superiority (from liberty) prevails over those.

That it can and must be *taught*, is a consequence of its not being innate; ethics are therefore a *doctrine*. But as by the mere doctrine, how one ought to conduct himself, in order to be agreeable to the conception of virtue, the power for the exercise of the rules is not yet acquired; the stoics meant nothing by this but that virtue could not be *taught* by mere representations of duty, by exhortations (parenetically), but must by endeavours to overcome the internal enemy of man (ascetically) be cultivated, *exercised*; for one *can* not directly all that he *wills*, unless he has previously tried and exercised his powers, to which

H 5

however

however the *resolution* must at once be completely taken; because otherwise the mindedness (*animus*), in a capitulation with vice, to forsake it by degrees, must be in itself impure and even vitious, consequently can produce no virtue (as it rests upon a single principle).

50.

As to the doctrinal method, (for every scientific doctrine must be *methodical*; else the propounding were *tumultuary*) it cannot be *fragmentary*, but must, if ethics shall represent a *science*, be *systematical*. — The propounding however may be either *acroamatical*, as all those, to whom it is made, are mere auditors, or *erotematical*, when the teacher questions his disciples concerning what he is to teach them; and this erotematical method is either that, when he questions their *reason*, — the *dialogical*, or merely their *memory*, the *catechetical*, method. For if one person is to question the reason of another about something, it cannot be done but dialogically, *id est*, by the master and scholar's questioning and answering one another *reciprocally*. The master directs by questions his scholar's train of thoughts, by merely unfolding the predisposition to certain conceptions in it by cases which he puts (he is the midwife of his thoughts); the scholar, who perceives by this that he himself is able to think, occasions by his questions (about obscurity, or the doubt opposed to the positions granted) that the *master* according to the *docendo discimus* learns himself how to question properly. (For it is a demand made on logic, not yet sufficiently considered, that it shall furnish rules, how one is to *seek* conformably-to-end, *id est*, not always for merely *determining*, but for *previous*, judgments (*judicia praevia*), by which one is led to thoughts; a doctrine that may give a hint even to the

the mathematician for making discoveries and which is often applied by him).

51.

The first and most necessary *doctrinal* instrument of ethics for the yet raw pupil is a moral *catechism*. This must precede the catechism of religion and cannot be inserted as a parenthesis merely in the doctrine of religion, but must be propounded as a whole subsisting of itself; for by nothing but pure moral principles can the transition from ethics to religion be made; because their professions of this would otherwise be impure. — Hence the most eminent and the most worthy theologians have made no hesitation to compose a catechism for the statute-doctrine of religion (and at the same time to answer for it); one should think that it is the least that can be expected from their great stock of learning.

Whereas a pure *moral* catechism, as the fundamental doctrine of the duties of virtue, is obnoxious to no such scrupulosity, or difficulty, because it can be developed (as to its matter) from the common reason of man and needs be suitable (as to the form) but to the didactic rules of the first instruction. But the formal principle of such an instruction does not allow for this end the socratical *dialogical* method; because the scholar does not even know how to question; the teacher is therefore the only querist. The answer, however, which he draws methodically from the reason of the scholar, must be couched and preserved in determinate expressions, not easy to be altered, consequently committed to his memory; herein is distinguished the *catechetical method*, as well from the *dogmatical* (when the teacher only speaks), as from the *dialogical* (when both parties question and answer one another).

52.

The *experimental* (technical) means of forming to
virtue

virtue are the *good* example in the teacher himself (to conduct himself in an exemplary manner) and taking *warning* by others; for imitation is to the yet unformed man the first determination of will to the adopting of maxims, which he afterwards makes to himself. — The accustoming or the disaccustoming is the founding of a constant inclination without any maxims, by the frequent satisfying of it; and is a mechanism of the character, instead of a principle of the way of thinking (by which the *unlearning* will afterwards be more difficult than the *learning*). — But as to the force of *example* (whether of the good or of the bad), what presents itself to the propensity either to imitation, or to take warning,* that, which others give us, can ground no maxim of virtue. For this consists directly in the autonomy of the practical reason of every person, by consequence, not the behaviour or conduct of other men, but the law must serve us for the spring. Wherefore the pedagogue does not say to his naughty scholar, Take an example by that good (orderly, diligent) boy! for that but occasions his hating the other, because he is put in a disadvantageous light by him. The good example (the exemplary life) ought to serve, not for a pattern, but only for a proof of the feasibility of what is conformable to duty; therefore not the comparison with any other man whatever (as he is), but that with the idea (of humanity) as he ought to be, consequently with

* To take an example by, and, to adduce as an example or instance, are quite distinct conceptions. The former is a particular case of a *practical* rule, so far as it represents either the practicability or the impracticability of an action. An example, on the other hand, is but the particular (the concrete) represented as comprehended under the universal according to conceptions (the abstract) and merely theoretical exhibition of a conception.

with the law, must furnish the teacher the never failing standard of his education.

ANNOTATION.

Fragment of a moral Catechism.

The master = M. questions the reason of his scholar = S. about that which he intends to teach him and, if the scholar cannot answer the question = O, suggests answers to him (leading his reason).

1. M. What is thy greatest, nay, thy whole desire in life? S = O. — M. That *every thing may always* correspond both to thy wish and to thy will.

2. M. How is such a state named? S = O. M. It is named *felicity*, [constant wellbeing, a comfortable life, thorough contentment with one's condition].

3. M. If thou hadst all the felicity (which is possible in the world) in thy possession, Would'st thou keep the whole of it to thyself, or communicate it to thy neighbours too? — S. I would communicate it and render others likewise happy and contented.

4. M. That is a proof that thou hast a pretty good *heart*; let us however see whether thou shewest a good *understanding* also. — Would'st thou furnish the idler with pillows, that he may pass his life easily and agreeably in doing nothing; or supply the drunkard with wine, or what else is necessary for inebriation; or give the impostor an engaging figure and insinuating manners, in order to outwit others; or the violent and oppressive boldness and strength to be able to overcome others? These are all so many means, which every body wishes for, in order to be happy in his way. S. No, indeed.

5. Thou perceivest then, that, if thou hadst even all felicity in thy possession and over and above the best will, thou would'st not give those without

without hesitation to him, who catches at them, but would'st first examine how far every one is worthy of felicity. — M. But as to thyself, Would'st thou make no scruple to provide thyself first with every thing, which thou considerest necessary to thy happiness? S. Yes. M. Does not the question however occur to thee, whether thou be worthy of felicity thyself? S. Certainly. M. That now in thee, which endeavours but after felicity, is *inclination*; but that, which limits thy inclination to the condition, first to be worthy of this felicity, is thy *reason*, and that thou canst by thy reason limit and overpower thy inclination, is the liberty of thy will.

6. M. The rule and direction to know how thou must begin to enjoy felicity and yet not be unworthy of it, lie in thy *reason* only; that is to say, it is not necessary for thee to learn this rule of thy conduct from experience, or from others by their instruction; thy own reason teaches and commands thee directly what thou hast to do. For instance, if a case should occur, when by an artful *lie* thou canst procure thyself or thy friend a great advantage, nay, without thereby injuring any other person, What says thy reason to this? S. I ought not to lie; let the advantage to me or to my friend be ever so great. To lie is *base* and dishonourable and renders men *unworthy* of being happy. — Here is an unconditional necessitation by a commandment of reason (or an interdiction), which I must obey: before which all my inclinations must become silent. M. How is this immediate necessity imposed on man by reason to act conformably to a law of it named? S. It is named *duty*. M. The observance of one's duty then is the universal and only condition of the worthiness to be happy, and this is identical with that.

7. M. But when we are conscious to ourselves of such a good and active will, by which we hold ourselves worthy (at least not unworthy) of felicity, Can we

we found thereupon the sure hope to obtain this felicity? S. No, not upon that only, for it is not always in our power to procure it for ourselves, nor does the course of nature of its own accord direct itself according to merit, but the fortune of life (our welfare in general) depends upon circumstances, which are not all by any means in the power of man. Our felicity therefore always remains but a wish, without the possibility of ever becoming hope, unless some one potency or other should survene.

8. M. Has reason grounds on its side for assuming such a potency as actual, distributing felicity according to the merit and demerit of men, commanding all nature and governing the world with the greatest wisdom, *id est*, to believe in God? S. Yes; for we see in the works of nature, that we can judge, so extensive and profound wisdom, which we cannot explain to ourselves but by an ineffably great art of a Creator of the world, from whom we have reason to promise ourselves, as to the moral order, in which however consists the greatest ornament of the world, a no less wise government; so that, when we do not render ourselves *unworthy of felicity*, but which we do by the transgression of our duty, we may hope to *obtain* felicity.

In this catechism, which must be carried through all the articles of both virtue and vice, the greatest attention must be bestowed, not to found the commandment of duty in either the advantages or the disadvantages accruing from its observance to the men, whom it is to bind, nay, not even to others, but perfectly pure in moral principle; of the latter (of vices) mention is made but by the way, as additaments in themselves indeed superfluous, but serving as mere vehicles for the palates of those by nature weak. The *turpitude*, but not the *perniciousness*, of vice (to the delinquent himself) must in all cases be conspicuously exhibited. For, when the dignity of
virtue

virtue in actions is not elevated above every thing, the conception of duty itself vanishes and runs into mere pragmatistical precepts; as then the nobility of man disappears in his own consciousness, he becomes vendible, and is to be purchased for what seducing inclinations offer him.

When this has been wisely and punctually unfolded out of the proper reason of man according to the difference of the degrees of age, of sex and of condition, which man gradually enters into, the conclusion must be made by something still, which intimately moves the soul and puts man in a situation, where he cannot contemplate himself but with the greatest admiration of the original predispositions with which he is endowed, and of which the impression can never be obliterated. — Namely, when at the finishing of his instruction his duties are once more summarily recapitulated in their order, when at every one of them he is made attentive that all the evils, afflictions and sufferings of life, even the threatening with death, that may befall him, because he faithfully observes his duty, cannot deprive him of the consciousness of being superior to them and master of them all; the question now, What is that in thee, which dares venture to engage in a combat with all the powers of nature in and around thee, when they clash with thy moral principles? is of great importance to him. When this question, whose solution totally transcends the faculty of speculative reason and which nevertheless occurs naturally, is taken to heart, even the incomprehensibility of this self-cognition must give the soul an exaltation which, the more it is tempted, animates it but the more to hold its duty sacred.

In this catechetical moral instruction it would be of great utility to the moral education, together with every dissection of duty to put a few casuistical questions and to let the children, who are assembled, try

try their understanding, how every one of them is of opinion to solve the insnaring problem proposed to him. — Not only that this is a culture of *reason* the best suited to the capacity of the unformed (because reason can much easier decide in questions, which concern what is duty, than in regard of speculatives ones) and the fittest mode of whetting the understanding of youth in general, but chiefly because it lies in the nature of man to *love* that, which he has by study and labour brought to a science (that he now understands), and thus is the disciple by such exercises imperceptibly bent to the *interest* of morality.

It is however of the greatest moment in education, not to teach the moral catechism incorporated (not to amalgamate it) with the catechism of religion, and of still greater not to let it follow this; but with the utmost diligence and exactitude to make the clearest introspection into the former. For without this religion is nothing but hypocrisy, to profess duties out of fear and to feign taking a part in them, which is not in the heart.

SECTION THE SECOND.

THE ETHICAL ASCETIC.

53.

THE rules of the exercise in virtue (*exercitiorum virtutis*) have in view the two dispositions, to be of a *vigorous* and of a *cheerful* mind (*animus strenuus et hilaris*) in the observance of the duties of virtue. For it has hinderances to combat, for the overcoming of which it must collect its forces, and at the same time many joys of life to sacrifice, whose loss may sometimes render the mind gloomy and peevish; but that which is not done with pleasure, but merely as villanage, has to him, who complies herein with the dictates of his duty, no intrinsic value and is not liked, but the occasion of its exercise avoided as much as possible.

The culture of virtue, that is, the moral *ascetic*, has, in respect of the principle of the strenuous, courageous and vigorous exercise of virtue, the *dictum* of the Stoics, Accustom thyself to support the fortuitous ills of life and to do without the just as superfluous pleasures (*assuesce incommotis et desuesce commoditatibus vite*). It is a species of *dietetic* for man, to keep himself morally healthy. *Health* however is but a negative being-well, it cannot be felt itself. Something, which yields an agreeable enjoyment of life and yet is barely moral, must supervene. It is the constantly joyful heart in the idea of the virtuous Epicurus. For who should have more cause to be in a jovial mood and not even to find therein a duty, to acquire a cheerful disposition and to render it habitual to himself, than he, who is not conscious to himself of any wilful trespass and is secure from falling into such (*hic murus abeneus*

esto &c. Hor.). — Whereas the ascetic of the monks which, out of superstitious fear, or feigned aversion from one's self, goes to work with self-tormenting and mortification of the flesh, aims not at virtue, but at enthusiastical purging from sin, instead of *repenting* morally (*id est*, for the purpose of amendment) to do *penance*, which in a punishment chosen by and inflicted on one's self (for another must always inflict it) is a contradiction, and cannot occasion the cheerfulness, which accompanies virtue, but rather cannot have place without a secret hatred against the commandment of virtue. — The ethical gymnastic consists, then, only in the combatting of the instincts of nature, which attains the degree to be able, in occurring cases that threaten danger to morality, to become master of them; consequently renders vigorous and, in the consciousness of one's reacquired liberty, cheerful. To *repent* of something (which, in recalling to mind former transgressions, is unavoidable, nay, it is even duty not to allow this reminiscence to die away) and to impose a *penitence* on one's self, (for instance, fasting) not with a dietetical, but with a pious, view, are two very different, morally meant, expedients, the latter of which, that is joyless, gloomy and surly, makes virtue itself hated and drives away its adherents. The discipline, which man exercises on himself, cannot therefore become meritorious and exemplary, but by the cheerfulness, with which it is accompanied.

CONCLUSION.

The Doctrine of Religion, as the Doctrine of Duties towards God, lies without the Bounds of pure Moral Philosophy.

PYTHAGORAS of Abdera began his book with these words, 'Whether there are or are not gods, I know not.' * For which reason the Athenians turned him out of the city, forced him to abandon his possessions, and burned his library publicly. (*Quintiliani Just. Orat. lib. 3. Cap. 1.*) — In this the judges of Athens, as *men*, wronged him greatly; but, as *officers of state* and judges, they proceeded quite *juridically* and consequentially; for, how could an oath have been taken, had it not been publicly and lawfully decreed *by the Senate* (*de par le Senat*), That there are gods, **

But

* '*De Diis, neque ut sint, neque ut non sint, habeo dicere.*'

** A great morally legislative sage has of late totally prohibited swearing as absurd and at the same time almost bordering on blasphemy; but with a political view this mechanical means, serviceable to the administration of public justice, is still believed absolutely impossible to be done without, and mild interpretations are invented in order to evade that prohibition. — As it were an absurdity to swear seriously that there is a God (because this must be postulated in order to be able but to swear in general), the question, Whether an oath be not possible and valid, when one swears but *in case there should be a God* (without making out any thing concerning it, like Pythagoras), still remains. — In fact all oaths taken honestly and at the same time with deliberation are perhaps not made in any other sense. — For, that one should offer to swear absolutely that there is a God, seems indeed not to be a dangerous offer, whether he believes in him, or not. If there is one, (says the impostor) I've hit it; if there is none, nobody calls

But conceding this belief, and granting that the *doctrine of religion* is a complement of the universal *doctrine of duties*, we have at present to inquire about the determination of the bounds of the *science*, to which it pertains, Whether it must be considered as a branch of ethics (for the right of men against one another cannot be here the question), or lying entirely without the bounds of a purely philosophical moral.

The *formal* of all religion, when it is explained to be The complex of all duties *as (instar)* divine commandments, belongs to the philosophical moral, because by that is expressed but the reference of reason to the *idea* of God, which reason itself frames and a duty of religion is then not yet made a duty *towards (erga)* God, as a being existing without our idea, while we hereby still abstract from his existence. — The ground that all duties of men shall be thought conformably to this *formal* (of their reference to a divine will, given *à priori*), is but subjectively logical. We cannot well make obligation (moral necessitation) intuitive to ourselves, without conceiving *another* and his will (of which universally legislative reason is but the speaker), namely, God. — — But this duty in *regard* of God (properly the *idea*, which we frame to ourselves of such a being) is the duty of man towards himself, *id est*, not objective the obligation to the performing of certain services to another, but only subjective for the corroboration of the moral spring in our own legislative reason.

But as to the *material* of religion, The aggregate

I 3 of

calls me to an account, and I run no risk by such an oath. — But is there then no risk, *if there is a God*, to be caught in a lie premeditated and even designed to deceive God?

of the duties *towards* (*erga*) God, *id est*, the service that must be performed to him (*ad præstandum*), it may comprise peculiar duties, as divine commandments, not arising from universally legislative reason only, therefore cognoscible by us, not *a priori*, but only empirically, by consequence appertaining but to the revealed religion; which does not therefore presuppose arbitrarily the existence of this Being, not merely his idea, with a practical view, and may be exhibited as immediately (or mediately) given in experience. Such a religion, however, in whatever manner it might be grounded, would not form any part of the *pure philosophical moral*.

Religion then, as a doctrine of the duties *towards* God, lies beyond all the bounds of the purely philosophical ethics; which serves for the vindication of the author of the present work, not to have included, for its completeness, as was formerly customary, in ethics, the religion, conceived in that sense.

The religion *within the bounds* of mere reason, but which is not derived *from* mere reason, but at the same time grounded upon doctrines of both history and revelation and which comprehends but the *agreement* of pure practical reason with them (that they may not clash with it), may indeed be the subject of inquiry. Then however it is not a *pure* doctrine of religion, but a doctrine of religion *applied* to a history before us, for which in *ethics*, as pure practical philosophy, there is no place.

Concluding Annotation.

ALL moral relations of rational beings, which contain a principle of the consension of the will of the one with that of the other, may be reduced to *love* and *reverence*, and, so far as this principle is practical, the determinative of the will in regard of the

the former to the *end*, in regard of the latter to the *right* of the other. — When one of these beings is such, as has rights merely against, but no duties towards the other (God), the other has consequently duties merely towards the former, but no rights against him, the principle of the moral relation between them is *transcendent* (whereas that of men to men, whose will towards one another is reciprocally limiting, has an *immanent* principle.)

The divine *end* in respect of the human race (their creation and guidance) cannot be otherwise conceived, than out of *love* only, *id est*, that it is the *felicity* of men. But the principle of the will of God in respect of the due *reverence* (awe), which limits the effects of the former, that is, the divine right, can be no other than that of *justice*. One might (according to the manner of men) express himself thus, God created rational beings, so to say, out of the necessity of having something besides himself, which he can love, or also by whom he is beloved.

But the claim is yet greater (because the principle is limiting), which the divine *justice*, in the judgment of our own reason, as *punitive* hath on us. — For a *reward* (*præmium, remuneratio gratuita*) refers not at all to justice towards beings, who have nothing but duties to and no rights against the others, but merely to love and benignity; — still less can a claim to *wages* (*merces*) have place with such a being, and a *remunerative justice* (*justicia brabentica*) is in the relation of God to man a contradiction.

But yet there is in the idea of an exercise of justice of a being, who is superior to all derogation in his ends, something, which cannot be well united with the relation of man to God, namely, the conception of a *lesion*, which may be committed on the illimited and unattainable Ruler (Sovereign) of the world; for the points in question are not the viola-
tions

tions of right, which men commit on one another, and which God as punishing judge decides, but the violation, which happens to God himself and to his right, the conception of which is *transcendent*, that is, lies quite beyond the conception of all punitory justice, of which we can produce any one example, (*id est*, of that among men), and contains transcendent principles, which cannot at all be made to harmonize with those we would use in cases of experience, consequently are totally void for our practical reason.

The idea of a divine punitive justice is here personified; it is not a particular judging being, who exercises it (for contradictions would then occur between him and the principles of law), but the *justice*, as if a substance, (named by some the *eternal justice*) which, like the *fate* (destiny) of the ancient philosophising poets, is still above Jupiter, and pronounces judgment according to the iron, not to be averted necessity, which is inscrutable to us. — Of this at present a few examples:

Punishment (according to Horace) does not lose sight of the criminal strutting before it but incessantly hobbles after, till it overtakes him. — The bloodshed of the innocent calls aloud for vengeance. — The crime cannot remain unrevenged; if the punishment should not reach the criminal, his posterity must suffer for it; or if it does not happen in his lifetime, it must in a life after death,* which is for this reason expressly

* The hypothesis of a future life needs not be here mixed, in order to represent that menacing punishment as complete in the execution. For man, contemplated according to his morality, is judged as a supersensible object before a supersensible judge, not according to conditions of time; his existence only is in question. His terrestrial life, whether it be short or long, or even perpetual, is but his existence in the phenomenon, and the

expressly assumed and willingly believed, in order that the demand of eternal justice may be satisfied. — I will allow no *bloodguiltiness* to come on my country, by pardoning a wicked murdering duellist, for whom you are interceding, said a well-minded sovereign. — The *debt of sin* must be discharged, should even a perfectly innocent person offer himself up as an expiatory sacrifice (when the suffering taken on himself could not indeed be properly named punishment, for he himself has not perpetrated a crime); from all which it may be perceived that it is not a *person* administering justice, to whom this doom is attributed (for he could not so speak, without injuring others), but that mere justice, as a transcendent principle imputed to a supersensible subject, determines the right of this being; which is conformable, it is true, to the *formal* of this principle, but repugnant to its *material*, the *end*, which is always the *felicity* of men. — For, by the probable great number of criminals, who always allow their register of guilt to run on, the punitive justice would not posit the *end* of the creation in the *love* of the Author of the world (as it must however be conceived), but in the strict observance of *law*, (to make law itself the *end* that is posited in the *honour* of God), which, as the latter (justice) is but the limiting condition of the former (goodness), seems to be inconsistent with the principles of the practical reason, according to which a creation of the world, which would have yielded a production so incongruous to the design of its Author that can have

the conception of justice requires no stricter determination; as then the belief in a future life does not properly precede, in order to let the effect of penal justice appear by it, but rather conversely from the necessity of punishment is drawn the inference of a future life.

have nothing but love for a foundation, must have remained undone.

Hence may be collected that in ethics, as a pure practical philosophy of the internal legislation, only the moral relations of *man* towards *man* are comprehensible to us; but what sort of a relation there is between God and man, totally transcends the sphere of those and is absolutely incomprehensible to us; whereby is then confirmed, what was above-maintained, that ethics cannot extend beyond the bounds of the reciprocal duties of man.

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THE END.

